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Case No. 20150737-SC 
!NTHE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
V. 
DAVID lvL i<.USHTON, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court 
of Appeals in State v. Rushton, 2015 UT App 170, 354 P.3d 223 (Addendum 
A). The Supre1ne Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
102(5) (West 2009). 
INTRODUCTION 
In this clain1-preclusion case, the only question is whether the State's 
successful prior prosecution of Defendant for tax cri1nes precludes the 
instant prosecution for wage-related crimes. 
Fro1n 2005 to 2008, Defendant evaded paying money owed to the 
goverrunent by failing to file personal and corporate tax returns and by 
fals ifying his e1nployees' W-2 forms. From 2008 through 2009, Defendant 
stole 111.oney from his employees by not putting money into their retirement 
accounts and by not paying their wages. The State prosecuted Defendant 
for the tax crimes and the wage crimes in separate criminal cases. 
On direct appeal, Defendant argued that the successful prosecution of 
the tax case barred the State from later prosecuting hin1 for the wage crilnes 
because the two cases were part of a single criminal episode. Applying the 
plain language of the statute and relying on decades-old authority, the court 
of appeals affinned, holding that there were distinct criminal episodes here 
and the State was not therefore barred from separately prosecuting 
Defendant for the wage offenses. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
This Court granted certiorari to review the following question: 
Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the dish·ict 
court's conclusion that the crimes for which Petitioner was 
prosecuted in this case did not arise from the same "single 
criminal episode" as the cri1nes prosecuted in a prior case that 
resulted in a guilty plea. 
Order, dated 26 October 2015. 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews the court of appeals' decision 
for correctness. State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, , [15, 1.44 P.3d 1096. "The 
correch1.ess of the court of appeals' decision lurns, in part, on whether it 
accurately reviewed the court's decision under the 
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• 
appropriate standard of review." Id. The court of appeals reviewed the 
h·ial court's denial of a 1notion to disnuss for correcl11ess. See Strzte v. 
Rushton, 2015 UT App 170, if 4,354 P.3d 223. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendmn B: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (West 2015); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (West 2015); 
Utah Code Alu1. § 76-1-403 (West 2015); 
Utah Code Alu1. § 77-8a-1 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 
1. Defendant's tax offenses. 
Defendant began Fooptube, a video game company, in January 2005. 
R31. Defendant and his wife Maureen were the owners and operators of the 
company, and Fooptube's "management team" was largely c01nprised of 
Defendant's family 1ne1nbers. R58-59. Within that sh·ucture, it was 
Defendant who "1nade the decisions of who was to be paid and who was 
not to be paid." R59. 
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Sometime in early 2008, Scott Mann, an agent with the Cri1ninal 
Investigation Unit of the Utah State Tax Commission, began investigating 
allegations that Defendant and Maureen had withheld personal and 
corporate taxes. RSS,144-45. 
On 14 April 2009, Assistant Attorney General Mark Baer, filed 
charges against Defendant in case no. 091903070 (hereinafter "the tax case"). 
See R179-185 (Information for case no. -3070 attached as Addendmn C). 
• In count I, Defendant was charged with failing to file quarterly 
corporate tax returns for the entire year 2007 and the first two 
quarters of 2008, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-ll0l(l)(c) 
(West 2004); 
• In count II, Defendant was charged with co-1ningling funds and/ or 
creating false documents with the intent to "evade the payment of 
their withholding tax obligations for tax years from 2007 through 
2008," a violation of Utah Code Ann.§ 76-8-ll0l(l)(d) (West 2004); 
o In count III, Defendant was charged with failing to remit his 
e1nployees' taxes to the State of Utah for the entire year 2007 and the 
first two quarters of 2008, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 
(West 2004); 
-4-
• 
• 
• 
• In count IV, Defendant was charged with issuing fraudulent W-2 
forms to the State and withholding tax statements fro1n e1nployees 
"on or about January 31, 2008," a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-1801 (West 2004); 
• In count V, Defendant was charged with failing to "file personal 
income tax returns for the tax year(s) 2005, 2006, and/ or 2007," in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-ll0l(l)(c) (West 2004); and 
• In count VI, Defendant was charged with engaging in a pattern of 
unlawful activity in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603 (West 
2004), with the predicate offenses being the tax offenses described 
above. 
See R179-185. In a separate case, Defendant's wife was charged with the 
same six counts. See docket for case 091903069. 
Defendant was arraigned on the tax case on 14 December 2009. See 
R91; see also docket for case no. 091903070 a t *6. On 24 June 2010, Defendant 
entered a plea agreen1ent with the State in which he pleaded guilty to 
counts V & VI. R167-176. For count V, Defendant adn1itted the crilninal 
conduct at issue occurred "on or about April 15th of 2006, 2007[,] and 2008." 
R168. For count VI, Defendant ad1nitted that the criminal conduct at issue 
occurred "[d]uring years 2006 through 2008 inclusive." [d. In exchange for 
-5-
Defendant's guilty pleas, the State dis1nissed the remaining charges, agreed 
to various sentencing concessions, and dis1nissed all charges against 
Defendant's wife. See id.; see also R58. 
2. Discovery of Defendant's wage offenses. 
As noted, the tax case was filed on April 14, 2009. See R179-185. On 
May 5, 2009, after the tax charges had been filed but before Defendant had 
been arraigned, the court held a roll call hearing. See R89-90; see also docket 
for case no. 091903070 at *3-4; R144. Adain Hunter, a former Fooptube 
employee, attended that hearing alongside other forn1er employees. R138-
140. Hunter was aware that criminal charges had been filed against 
Defendant, but he mistakenly believed they were about Defendant's failure 
to pay his e1nployees' wages, not about any tax issues. R139-140. At the 
May 5 hearing, Hunter realized "for the very first time that the charges 
against [Defendant] were solely charges based upon tax related allegations 
and had nothing to do with the fact" that he and his coworkers had not 
been paid by Defendant. Id. 
After the hearing, Hunter and several £orn1er co-workers were 
gathered outside the courthouse steps when they saw AAG Baer- the 
attorney prosecuting the tax case-walking by. R140. Up until that point, 
Hunter "had never seen [Baer], had never contacted hiin or his office nor 
-6-
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• 
• 
• 
had any of the other former employees." Id . . Baer later filed an affidavit 
confinning that, at that point, he "did not know these individuals, had 
never spoken to them before, and did not recognize the1n in any fashion." 
R145. 
Hunter and his former co-workers stopped AAG Baer and told him 
that, in addition to the alleged tax offenses, Defendant also had not paid 
their wages or retirement benefits. R140. This was the first tune that Baer 
had heard of these allegations. R140)45. He asked the group to come back 
to his office i1n1nediately, where they met with Agent Mann and told hhn 
their story. R140-41,145. 
After that meeting, AAG Baer "sought and received approval to 
conduct a second investigation iI1to the allegations involviI1g non-payment 
of wages" and also "the withholding of funds from employee wages for 
retirement purpose[s]." R145. Agent Mann later filed a report detailing his 
criIT1inal investiga tion. R54-61. In that report, Agent Mann stated that 95 of 
Defendant's former employees had filed claims with the Utah Labor 
Commission (ULC) alleging that Defendant had not paid their wages. R58. 
Based on available records, Agent Mann concluded that during "pay 
periods fr01n October 1, 2008 through December 31 of 2009/' Defendant 
failed to pay $1) 70,164 in owed wages. Id. 
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During this investigation, Agent Mann learned that Defendant was 
also being investigated by the United States DeparhT1ent of Labor for failing 
to "re1nit employee's contributions to a traditional 401k and Roth 401k 
pension plan being operated" by Fooptube. Id. A records search later 
showed that Defendant and his niece had been the plan administrators and 
"had failed to remit contributions to the plan for a period of February 2007 
through October 2008," with the total amount diverted being $107,000. Id. 
During a subsequent interview with a federal investigator, Defendant 
"ad1nitted that he knew that he was supposed to deposit the funds 
i1nn1ediately into the plan's account" and that '"he was responsible for the 
decision to delay or not to pay the contributions"' to that account. R59. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
On 20 April 2011, AAG Baer filed new criminal charges against 
Defendant in case no. 111903029 (hereinafter "the wage case"). R1-6;R24-32. 
• In counts I & II, Defendant was charged with c01m11unications fraud, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1801 (West 2004) and 76-2-
202 (Wes t 2004), for devising a scheme "to obtain or defraud money 
fr01n the defendants' employee compensation and/ or retirement 
arrangen1ents via false pretenses" and for "communicat[ing] su ch 
false pr01nises or false or fraudulent pretenses with said employees." 
-8-
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• 
• 
Count I alleged that this occurred "on or about [the] calendar year 
2008," while Count II alleged that this occurred "on or about 
calendar year 2009." 
~ In counts III & IV, Defendant was charged with one count of unlawful 
dealing of property by a fiduciary, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-513 (West 2004), for failing to remit the "employee wages 
and/ or retire1nent funds ... which had been enh·usted to hiln." 
Count III alleged that this occurred "during [the] calendar year 
2008," while count IV alleged that this occurred "during calendar 
year 2009." 
1a In counts V & VI, Defendant was charged with theft of services, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann.§ 76-6-409 (West 2004), for obtaining the 
services of "up to 95 or more employees without the benefit of 
compensating said e1nployees for their services." Count V alleged 
that this occurred "during [the] calendar year 2008," while count VI 
alleged that this occurred" during [the] calendar year 2009." 
o As alternative counts to the theft of services charges, the State 
charged Defendant with 12 counts (counts VII through XIX) of 
failing to pay wages in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-12 
(West 2004), w ith each count being based on an individual 
-9-
and 
month during the period fro1n October 2008 through October 
2009; 
• In count XX, Defendant was charged with engaging in a pattern of 
unlawful aclivity "on or about years 2008 and 2009," in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603 (West 2004), with the predicate offenses 
being the wage offenses described above. 
R24-32 (Addendum D). 
1. Trial court denies motion to dismiss wage case. 
On 21 December 2011, Defendant filed a motion to dis1niss the wage 
case, alleging that the wage crimes were part of a single crin1inal episode 
with the tax crimes and that Defendant therefore could not be prosecuted 
for then1 because the tax case had already resulted in a conviction. R35-134. 
In a subsequent filing, Defendant supported this argument by claiming that 
he had used money from both cases for the same purpose: to pay "company 
bills and obligations in hopes of keeping the company afloat." R201. 
The court held a hearing on Defendant's motion to dismiss on 3 May 
2012. R212-13. After argmnents frmn both sides, the court ruled from the 
bench. See R391:19-22. The court concluded that although the tax charges 
and the wage charges were closely related in time to each other, they were 
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not part of a single criminal episode because they were not part of an 
attempt to accomplish "a single criminal objective." R391:21-22. The court 
noted that the cases involved "different issue[s]," "different law[s]," 
"different instructions," and different victims. R391:22. The court thus 
expressed its belief that trying them together would have been "confusing" 
for a jury. Id. The court accordingly denied the motion to dismiss. Id. 
2. Defendant enters conditional guilty plea in wage case. 
On 6 August 2012, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to one 
count of attempted unlawful dealin.g by a fiduciary, one count of failing to 
pay employee wages, and one count of engaging in a pattern of unlawful 
activity with respect to wage and benefit issues. R223-24. For each count, 
Defendant admitted that the criminal conduct at issue occurred between 
October 2008 and 2009. R226-27. Defendant reserved the right to appeal the 
denial of his motion to dism.iss. R357:3-4. 
On 10 October 2012, Defendant was sentenced to one year in jail. 
R304. On 31 October 2012, the court signed a final order denying the 
motion to dismiss. R318-22. 
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3. The court of appeals affirms. 
On appeal, Defendant again. argued that the wage crimes and tax 
crimes constituted a single crimir1al episode. The court of appeals rejected 
that argument and affirmed. See generally Rushton, 2015 UT App 170. 
The court began by first surveying the different ways that the phrase 
"single criminal episode" can be at issue in criminai cases. Rushton, 2015 UT 
App 170, ~19-15. The court noted that it generally arises in three kin.ds of 
scenarios: (1) cases in which the issue was whether the defendant's 
"conduct could be charged as 1nore than one offense or amounted to only a 
single offense," which implicates double jeopardy; (2) cases in which the 
issue was whether "separate offenses arguably arising from a single 
criminal episode must be h·ied together" under the Single Crilninal Episode 
Statute; and (3) "cases that address whether separate offenses arguably 
arising fr01n a single crilninal episode may be h·ied separately" - i.e ., 
severance. Id. at 19. 
The court then noted that in State v. Strader, 902 P.2d 638 (Utah App. 
1995), it had determined that in the first two kinds of cases, the phrase 
"single criminal episode" should be interpreted "narrow [ly ]" to reflect the 
particular constitutional or legislative policy goals at issue in those kinds of 
cases, but that in cases arising under the third category, the phrase should 
-12-
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be interpreted "expansive[ly ]" to reflect the differing statutory policy at 
issue there. Rushton, 2015 UT App 170, ,I,110-12. The court concluded that 
cases frmn the "second category" would be " the most useful" in this case 
because of the nature of Defendant's claim. Id. at i[15. 
The court then affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion 
to dismiss the wage offenses. Id. at i[i[16-25. The court held that the wage 
crimes were not part of a single criminal episode with the tax crilnes 
because "the crimes in each case" were "entirely separate," involved 
different victilns, were not done in furtherance of each other or otherwise 
linked by a single shared objective, and were separated by "te1nporal 
distinctions." Id. at ilif20,21,n.9. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Single Criminal Episode Statute bars separate prosecutions for 
single-cri1ninal-episode offenses when four limiting conditions are present. 
As relevant here, a prior prosecution bars a later prosecution when the 
offenses were part of a single criminal episode- n1eaning they were closely 
related in time and shared a single criminal objective. 
Defendant argues that the court of appeals erred in narrowly 
construing the Single Criminal Episode Statute to hold that his tax and 
wage crimes were not part of a single cri1ninal episode and therefore the 
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prosecution of the tax case did not bar the later prosecution of his wage 
crimes. But the court of appeals' consh·uction of the statute is consistent 
with this Court's own construction- and the Legislature's intent. 
Indeed, Utah has two different joinder statutes: The Single Crilninal 
Episode Statute here at issue governs mandatory joinder, i.e., when the State 
must join multiple offenses in a single information. But another statute 
governs permissive joinder, i.e., when the State 1nay-but is not required 
to-join multiple offenses in a single information. For a brief period of tirr1e 
the Legislature used the same phrase "single criminal episode" to defir1e 
both types of joinder. But in 1990, the Legislalure enacted a new version of 
the permissive joinder statute that no longer en1ploys the term single 
criminal episode; thus the two statutes now use different terms to serve 
their two different purposes. 
The Legislature enacted two different statutes with related, but 
different, purposes; it thus could not have intended for them to authorize 
joinder on the same basis. Because the Single Cri1ninal Episode Statute is 
rnore narrowly drawn and because it mandates joinder of single-criininal-
episode offenses, the Legislalure necessarily il1tended that it would be 
interpreted more narrowly than the more broadly drafted permissive joinder 
statute. Otherwise the Single Crin1inal Episode Statute would desh·oy the 
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permissive joinder statute. This Court's - and the court of appeals' -
interpretation of the Single Criminal Episode Statute is in harmony with 
both the narrow purpose of that statute and the broader purpose of the 
permissive joinder statute. 
Applying the sta tute here, Defendant's tax crimes and wage crimes 
were not part of a single criminal episode. The crilnes, though son1e 
overlapped, were entirely separate. They were separated by clear temporal 
distinctions where the tax crilnes co1mnenced two years before the wage 
crimes and the wage crimes concluded over a year after the tax case 
concluded. They also i.J.1volved different s tatutes, different victims, and 
were not done in furtherance of each other, let alone li.J.1ked by a shared 
criminal objective. Thus, the court of appeals correctly held tha t the State's 
successful prosecution of Defendant's tax crimes did not bar the later 
prosecution of Defendant's wage crimes. This Court should affirm. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE WAGE CRIMES FOR WHICH DEFENDANT WAS 
PROSECUTED HERE DID NOT ARISE FROM THE SAME 
"SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE" AS THE TAX CRIMES 
PROSECUTED IN A PRIOR CASE THAT RES UL TED IN A 
GUILTY PLEA. 
The question on certiorari is whether Defendant's tax and wage 
crimes constituted a single criminal episode such that the State's successful 
prosecution of the tax crimes barred a subsequent prosecution of the wage 
offenses. Applying the Single Criminal Episode Statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 
76-1-401 e.t. seq. 405 (West 2015), the court of appeals correctly held that 
they did not. See Rushton, 2015 UT App 170, if,116-26. 
Defendant challenges the court of appeals' holding on the basis that 
the court erred in interpretin.g the Single Crhninal Episode Statute 
narrowly. Pet.Br.34-36. According to Defendant, his tax and wage crilnes 
shared the single criminal objective of "misappropriation," and the State 
therefore could not charge hi1n in the wage case after having already tried 
the tax case. Pet.Br.28-29. Defendant argues that the court of appeals' 
narrow interpretation of the Single Cri1ninal Episode Statute is inconsistent 
with the plain and ordinary 1neaning of the statute, as well as the 
Legislature's intent that the statute be applied in the same fashion in "all 
appeals involving a single cri1ninal episode including: merger, severance, 
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joinder, and," as here, "the bar on multiple prosecutions." Pet.Br.40 . 
Finally, Defendant argues that the court of appeals' narrow approach 
"embeds a method for disparate h·eatment of litigants in its statutory 
construction." Pet.Br.41. 
Contrary to Defendant's argument, the court of appeals' interpretation is 
entirely consistent with the plain language of the Single Criminal Episode 
Statue, as well as the Legislature's intent. As will be shown, in Utah, the 
Single Criminal Episode Statute governs mandatory joinder while another 
statute governs permissive joinder. The Single Crinlinal Episode Statute 
must therefore be viewed in context with the pennissive joinder statute and 
that sta tute's related-but different-purpose-i.e., to allow, but not 
require, joinder of a broader range of crilnes. So viewed, the court of 
appeals properly i11terpreted the Single Criminal Episode Statute narrowly. 
Whether viewed as a narrow or plain language interpretation, the court of 
appeals' interpretation of the Single Criminal Episode Statute is consistent 
with this Court's own interpretation. This Court should therefore affinn. 
A. Utah has two joinder statutes that serve related-but 
different- purposes. 
The joinder of offenses i11 Utah is governed by two different statutory 
provisions: Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-1 (West 2004), and Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-401, et. seq. 405. Section 77-8a-1 governs pennissive joinder, or when 
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the State may-but is not required to-join multiple offenses in a si.J.1.gle 
information for purposes of judicial econon1y. Sections 76-1-401 through 76-
1-403-i.e., the Single Cri1ninal Episode Statute-govern mandatory joinder, 
or when the State must charge separate offenses in a single information; it 
thus contemplates joining a 1nore narrow range of crimes than does the 
pennissive joinder statute. 
Cases interpreting the permissive joi.J.1.der statute uphold the jornder 
of offenses that are separated by hours and days and which involve 
multiple victims or objectives, where the offenses are also "connected 
together in their cmnnussion," 1neani.J.1g, e.g., one offense precipitates a later 
offense, or they share some other external or visual connection, or when the 
offenses are part of "a common schen1e or plan." 
In contrast, cases interpreting the Si.J.1.gle Criminal Episode Statute -
i.e. , 1nandatory joinder, are more restrictive. It is not enough to' have a 
visual connection or common scheme to mandate joinder. While multiple 
offenses arising from a crime spree involving 1nultiple victims may be joi.J.1.ed 
where they are "connected together in their c01n1nission" or part of a 
"con11non sche1ne or plan," section 77-Sa-l(l), the same offenses are not 
required to be joined under the Single Criininal Episode Statute unless they 
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are also "closely related in ti1ne" - i.e., nearly contemporaneous, and share a 
"single cri1ninal objective," Utah Code Ann.§ 76-1-401. 
1. Section 77-8a-1 permits joinder of a broad spectrum of 
crimes for purposes of judicial economy. 
Section 77-8a-1 governs the permissive joinder of charges. The statute 
permits the joinder of offenses in a relatively broad range of circumstances: 
the State "may" charge 1nultiple offenses in the same information when 
they are: " (a) based on the san1e conduct or are otherwise connected 
together in their commission; or (b) alleged to have been part of a common 
scheme or plan." Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-1(1). The purpose of pern1issive 
joinder is "to conserve time and effort when justice can best be served 
thereby." State v. Germon.to, 868 P.2d 50, 60 (Utah 1993) (quoting State v. 
Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah 1979), construing predecessor to section 
77-8a-1(1)); accord State v. Lamb, 2013 UT App 5, ,r7, 294 P.3d 639 (purpose of 
section 77-8a-1 "is to allow joinder of offenses and thus eliminate multiple 
prosecutions in the interest of efficiency and economy of time and effort 
when the interests of justice can best be served thereby" (quota tion and 
citation omitted)). 
Like section 77-8a-l, its predecessor provisions have traditionally 
permitted joinder for a broad spech·um of crin1es. For exan1ple, section 77-
21-31- the pennissive joinder statute in 1973 -permitted the joinder of 
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offenses when they were "related or connected together in their 
com1nission." Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-31 (1973) (superseded). In 1975, 
section 77-21-31 was amended to permit joinder when the offenses were" of 
the same or similar character" or "based on the same act or h·ansaction or on 
two or 1nore acts or h·ansactions connected together or cons tituting parts of 
a comm.on scheme or plan." Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-31 (1975) 
(superseded). 
In 1980, section 77-21-31 was repealed and replaced with section 77-
35-9, which adopted more resh·ictive language for permissive joinder: "Two 
or 1nore offenses 1nay be charged in the same indictment or information in a 
separate count for each offense if the offenses charged arise out of a crim.inal 
episode as defined in section 76-1-401." Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-9(a) (1980) 
(superseded). But in 1990, the Legislature repealed section 77-35-9 and 
replaced it with section 77-8a-1-the current provision governing 
pern1issive joinder. See Laws 1990, c.201 §1. The legislative history suggests 
that the Legislature enacted section 77-8a-1(1) in response to a widespread 
misapplication of section 77-35-9 by lrial courts: 
Senate Bill 181 gives judges the option to c01nbine separate 
offenses into one charge when they are part of a common 
scheme . . .. [M]any courts are now doing this in violation of 
this rule, and this bill is really to bring legality into what is 
going on in the name of efficiency. 
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Floor Debate SB181 Criminal Offense Charges available a t 
http://utahlegislature.granicus.com./MediaPlayer.php?clip_id=8991&meta 
_id=397396 (the discussion of SB181 starts at 43:00) (For the convenience of 
the Court, the Criminal Appeals Division prepared an unofficial h·anscript, 
see Addendum B). In other words, despite the more restrictive language of 
section 77-35-9, Utah courts continued to liberally pennit joinder in the 
name of judicial economy. 
This Court has not had the opportunity to interpret section 77-Sa-1(1) 
since it was enacted in 1990, but the court of appeals has done so a number 
of thnes. That court recognizes that charges are "connected together in their 
c01nmission" for purposes of pennissive joinder "where a later crime is 
'precipitated by' an earlier one, such as where the later crime facilitates 
flight after the earlier one." State v. Benson, 2014 UT App 92, 113, 325 P.3d 
855; see e.g., State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377, 385 (Utah App. 1997) (murder and 
theft counts properly joined where murder precipitated theft of car that 
allowed Scales to flee murder scene). A causal relationship is not always 
required, however; "the category of connected cases includes, but is not 
limited to, 'precipitation cases." See Benson, 2014 UT App, 114 (three counts 
of robbery against different victiins properly joined where robberies were 
c01nn1.itted within twenty-four hour period, and car stolen in first robbery 
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was used to commit later ones); State v. Burke, 2011 UT App 168, i!23, 256 
P.3d 1102 (sex crin1es against two different victims properly joined where 
criines occurred same night in same place as part of Burke's "distinct 
behavioral arc of increasingly aggressive and opportunistic transgressions 
of sexual boundaries"). 
The court of appeals has also "interpreted the phrase 'corm.non 
scheme or plan' to apply when the crimes involve a similar fact pattern and 
proximity in time." Lamb, 2013 UT App 5, if7 (citation omitted). However, 
the crimes need not "have been perpeh·ated in an absolutely identical 
manner, so long as the court perceives a visual connection between" them. 
Id.; see, e.g., id. at i14if9-11 (multiple counts of cattle rustling involving 
different owners, different kinds of cattle, and different days when cattle 
came in to Lamb's possession properly joined where "offenses all involved 
stray cattle, which were taken fro1n other cattlemen during seasonal cattle 
drives or round-ups, and which were all found in La1nb' s possession after a 
. long period of time and without him having taken any reasonable measures 
to return them to their owners"); State v. Hattrich, 2013 UT App 177, ,r21,n.3, 
317 P.3d 433 (three counts of sodo1ny on a child involving three different 
victims properly joined where Hattrich simultaneously groo1ned victin1s in 
similar manner over several years); State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114, 118 (Utah App. 
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1992) (two counts of aggravated robbery involving different victims 
properly joined where robberies occurred within five days of each other and 
Lee employed same "calculated plan" to rob gay men in a remote canyon 
shortly after first meeting them. in a gay bar) .1 
Given the above, section 77-8a-1(1) pern1its joinder for a broad range 
of crimes. Utah's mandatory joinder s tatute, on the other hand, requires 
joinder in a more narrow set of circumstances. 
2. The Single Criminal Episode Statute mandates joinder of 
separate offenses arising from a single criminal episode 
as a limited expansion of double jeopardy protections. 
The Single Criminal Episode Statute, encompassing sections 76-1-401 
through 76-1-405, governs the prosecution of offenses arising out of a 
"single criminal episode" and requires joir1.der in limited circumstances. 
Under section 76-1-403, joinder of offenses is required only where the 
'Courts in other jurisdictions sinularly view " the terms 'connected 
together' and 'part of a conm1on scheme or plan' as theoretically linked, that 
is, as both permitting joir1.der where counts 'grow out of related 
transactions."' United States v. Buchanan, 930 F.Supp. 657, 662 (D.Mass. 1996) 
(quotations and citation omitted); see nlso United States v. Wisdom, 19 F.3d 
1190, 1196 (7th Cir. 1994) (recogiuzing offenses are "connected together" 
where proof of one offense "constitutes a substantial portion of the proof of 
the other"); State v. Kirk, 266 P.3d 1262, 1265 (Mont. 2011) (" one charge 
precipitated[ d] the second charge," or charges are so linked "overlapping 
proof" would be required at trial) (quotations and citation 01nitted); State v. 
Floyd, 558 S.E.2d 237, 239 (N.C. App. 2002) (recognizing there "1nust be 
some sort of transactional connection between cases consolidated for trial" 
or "c01nn1on issues of fac t" (quotations and citation omitted)). 
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offenses (1) arise "out of a single crimir1al episode," and should be "h·ied 
under Subsection 76-1-402(2)" -i.e., (2) "[t]he offenses are within the 
jurisdiction of a single court," and (3) "[t]he offenses are known to the 
prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned on the first 
information or indichnent," Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(2). As explained by 
this Court in State v. Ririe, these elements - or "limiting terms" - "are 
significant." 2015 UT 37, ,rs, 345 P.3d 1261. 
The Single Criminal Episode Statute "does not prescribe a universal 
bar on multiple prosecutions." Id. It "limits this bar to cases falling within its 
terms." Id.; accord id. at ifl7 ("Sections 402 and 403 do not in fact adopt a 
universal rule of clailn preclusion. They adopt a n1ore liinited one."). The 
Single Cri1niI1al Episode Statute is "a species of res judicata or claim 
preclusion for criminal cases - barring prosecutions for different offenses 
committed as part of a single crin1inal episode and otherwise meetiI1g the 
terms of the statute." 2015 UT 37, il6 (emphasis :iJ.1 origfr1al). These claim 
preclusion provisions represent a liinited extension of the constitutional 
double jeopardy protections against "multiple prosecutions or 1nultiple 
sentences for the same offense." Id. In other words, the statute is a 
legislative policy judgment that insulates "a defendant 'prosecuted for one 
or more offenses arising out of a sfr1gle criminal episode' ... from. a 
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'subsequent prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out of the 
same criminal episode." Id. at ,r7 (quoting section 76-1-403(1)); accord 
Rushton, 2015 UT App 170, i16 (same). 
The only issue in this case is the single-criminal-episode requirement 
for 1nandatory joinder. The Single Criminal Episode Statute mandates 
joinder only for offenses that, as a threshold matter, arise out of a "single 
criminal episode." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(1). A "single criminal 
episode, in turn, is defined as all conduct that (1) "is closely related in time," 
and (2) "is incident to an atte1npt or an accomplishment of a single criminal 
objective." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401. The Utah Criminal Code 
Co1nmentary to the Single Criminal Episode Statute when it was adopted in 
1973 provided an example: 
[T]he actor who enters a dwelling with intent to commit larceny 
and in the process c01mnits a sexual assault upon a female, then 
forces the fe1nale to leave with hi1n as a hostage to insure his 
get-away would be guilty of burglary, sexual assault, and 
kidnapping. Because all of these events were closely related in 
time and were incident to the accomplishment of a single 
criminal objective, i.e., the burglary and escape [from the 
burglary], they would necessarily constitute a single criminal 
episode. 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE OUTLINE, Utah Criminal Code Commentary 144 
(prepared by Jay V. Barney, J.D., University of Utah College of Law) (1973) 
(Addendum B). In other words, joinder is not n1andated 1nerely because the 
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offenses were "part of a common scheme or plan" or were "otherwise 
connected together in their cmnmission." Utah Code Ann. § 77-Sa-1(1). 
More is required. 
Lhniting the statute's bar to "cases falling within its terms" is 
particularly important with regard to the threshold single-crilninal-episode 
limitation. Ririe, 2015 UT 37, ,rs. This is because the "same concerns for 
judicial economy and protection of defendants" that the Single Criminal 
Episode Statute serves "simply do not arise when the conduct" at issue "is 
not part of a single criminal episode because the offenses do not share an 
interlwined factual or legal history that makes separate prosecutions 
inefficient or repetitive." Id. at 'if 13; see also State v. Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, 
,I22, 294 P.3d 617 (same). Thus, by liiniting the single-cri1ninal-episode bar 
to cases that are "closely related in time" and that serve "a single criminal 
objective," the Legislature has ensured "that the joinder requirement does 
not unduly preclude prosecution for charges that do not arise out of a single 
crilninal episode." Rushton, 2015 UT App 170, ,112. 
Given the above, both this Court and the court of appeals have 
generally declined to hold that a prior prosecution bars a subsequent 
prosecution under the single-criminal-episode limitation. See, e.g., State v. 
Ireland, 570 P.2d 1206, 1207 (Utah 1977) (aggravated robbery and 
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kidnapping not part of single criminal episode where they involved 
different victims, and were separated by "distinct difference in tiine"); State 
v. Keppler, 1999 UT App 89, if 4, 976 P.2d 99 (possession of 
methamphetamine and marijuana pipe "at same time and in the same 
location" were not part of a single criminal episode where objectives for 
possessing the contraband were dissilnilar). The State is aware of only one 
case where the single-criminal-episode limitation was held to bar a later 
prosecution, State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 1983). But the result in Bair 
turned more on a failure of proof than a broad interpretation of the single-
criminal-episode limitation. See infra, at 35-37. And while a single cri1ninal 
episode 111ay include one or more crimes against one or more victilns, Utah 
courts have recognized such only where the crimes were nearly 
conte1nporaneous. See e.g., State v. James, 631 P.2d 854, 855 (Utah 1981) 
(James' conduct in simultaneously taking five drugstore customers hostage 
constituted five "separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode"). 
3. The Single Criminal Episode Statute is by its own terms 
more narrowly drawn than section 77-8a-1(1) and must 
therefore be interpreted to avoid destroying that section. 
As a matter of statutory construction, this Court must "interpret the 
provisions of a statute 'in hannony with other statutes in the sa1ne chapter 
and related chapters."' In re J.M.S., 2011 UT 75, ,I22, 280 P.3d 410 (quoting 
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State v. Harker, 2010 UT 56, ,r12, 240 P.3d 780) (emphasis in original). This 
means that "statutes should be construed so that no part or provision will 
be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section 
will not destroy another." Id. (citation, quotation, and alterations omitted). 
This canon of statutory consh·uction is relevant to an interpretation of 
Utah's two joinder statutes. 
As shown, the Legislature created two categories of joinder in Utah, 
mandatory and permissive. Section 77-Sa-1 permits - but does not require-
joinder for a broad spectrum of offenses-i.e., offenses that are "connected 
together in their comn1ission" or that are "part of a con1mon sche1ne or 
plan." Utah Code Ann. § 77-Sa-1(1); see also Point I.A.1., above. The Single 
Criminal Episode Statute, on the other hand, mandates joinder of multiple 
offenses when four strict ele1nents or limitations are met, including the 
single-criminal-episode limitation requiring the offenses be "closely related 
in tin1e" and share a "single crilninal objective." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401; 
see also Point I.A.2., above. 
Utah's pennissive and mandatory joinder statutes should not be-
and cannot be- interpreted to be synonymous. For example, if the tenn 
"single cri1ninal episode" is interpreted to be synony1nous with "com1non 
scheme or plan" or "com1ected together in their commission" for permissive 
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joinder, the Single Cri1ninal Episode Statute will necessarily render section 
77-8a-1(1) governing permissive joinder "inoperative or superfluous, void 
or insignificant," if not destroy it altogether. In re J.M.S., 2011 UT 75, 'if22. 
The Single Criminal Episode Statute must therefore be interpreted to 
mandate join.der under narrower circu1nstances than when joinder is 
permitted-but not required-under section 77-Sa-1(1). 
The legislative history supports that the Single Crilninal Episode 
Statute must be interpreted more narrowly than section 77-8a-1(1). For 
example, to the extent that the Legislature previously tried to accomplish 
two different aims with the same phrase when it incorporated II sin.gle 
criminal episode as defined section 76-1-401" into the 1980 version of the 
pennissive joinder statute (section 77-35-9(a)), it clearly intended to stop 
doing so when it repealed section 77-35-9(a) and enacted section 77-8a-1(1). 
See Laws 1990 c.201 §1. Unlike its predecessor, section 77-8a-1(1) no longer 
incorporates the phrase II single criminal episode." Thus, Utah's two join.der 
statutes now use different language to serve their related-but different -
purposes: Section 76-1-401 uses the phrase "single crin1inal episode" to 
describe circumstances when the State must join multiple offenses as a 
limited extension of double jeopardy principles, and section 77-Sa-1(1) uses 
the phrases - "connected toge ther in their cmnmission" and "common 
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scheme or plan" - to describe circun1stances when the State may join 
multiple offenses for purposes of judicial econon1y. 
Given the above, Utah courts must be careful not to interpret the 
phrase II single criminal episode" synony111ously with phrases used in the 
current permissive joinder statute-i.e., 11com1ected together in their 
commission" or II cormnon scheme or plan." As shown below, they have 
been. 
B. Consistent with the Legislature's intent, Utah courts 
consistently decline to apply a broad construction of the 
phrase "single criminal episode." 
Since the Single Crin1inal Episode Statute was enacted in 1973, see 
Laws 1973, c.196, this Court has considered whether a prior prosecution 
barred a later prosecution approxilnately seven tilnes, including 1nost 
recently in Ririe, 2015 UT 37; see also Bair, 671 P.2d 203; Hupp v. Johnson, 606 
P.2d 253 (Utah 1980); State v. Sosa, 598 P.2d 342 (Utah 1979); State v. Cooley, 
575 P.2d 693 (Utah 1978); State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977); Ireland, 
570 P.2d 1206. Of these seven cases, Bair, Hupp, Ireland, and Cornish, address 
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the specific "limiting condition" at issue here-namely, single criminal 
episode. Ririe, 2015 UT 37, ,i 9.2 
In three of those four cases - Cornish, Ireland, and Hupp - this Court 
rejected defense requests to adopt a broad construction of the Single 
Crimin.al Episode Statute and bar a later prosecution because it would have 
been contrary to the statute's language and intent. As noted, the fourth 
case - Bair- is the only case to hold that a prior prosecution barred a later 
h·ial under the single-crhninal-episode limitation. But as will be shown, the 
result in Bair turned on the State's failure to prove that more than one act of 
receiving stolen property occurred in that case, rather than a broad 
consh·uction of the sh1gle-cri1ninal-episode limitation. 
5 tate v. Cornish: Cornish. is this Court's fh·s t considera tion of the Single 
Criinh1.al Episode Statute. Cornish stole a car and drove in the wron g lane 
of traffic, ath·acting the attention of law enforcement. 571 P.2d at 577. 
Following a high speed chase, he fled on foot before being apprehended . Id. 
In separate prosecutions, the State convicted Cornish of unlawful taking of 
2In Ririe, Sousa, and Cooley, the single-criminal-episode limitation was 
not at issue. See Ririe, 2015 UT 37, iliJ9, 14 ("lin1iting condition" requiring 
involvement of a "'prosecuting attorney' and the use of an ' information or 
iI1.dict1nent"' not satisfied); Sosa, 598 P.2d at 344-45 (requiremen t that all 
charged offenses be "withiI1 the jurisdiction of a single court" not satisfied); 
Cooley, 575 P.2d at 694 (same). 
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an automobile and failing to stop at the com1nand of a police officer. Id. On 
appeal, Cornish challenged his failure to stop conviction on the basis that it 
was barred by his prior conviction £or the car theft. Id. Applying the single-
criminal-episode limitation, the Court held that the theft conviction did not 
bar the failure to stop prosecution because the two crimes were separated in 
time "by approximately one full day," and were also "separate in objective." 
Id. at 577-78. The "objective of the unlawful taking was to obtain possession 
... of another's automobile. It was a completed offense at the time the car 
was taken." Id. at 578. On the other hand, the "objective of the failure to 
stop was to avoid arrest for the h·affic violations he had just committed 
and/ or to avoid being found in a stolen motor vehicle." Id. The Court 
expressly declined to "treat" these two "distinct" objectives "as a single 
criminal episode" because it "would mean that any cri1ne a defendant 
c01nmits to avoid arrest for prior criminal activity would be part of the same 
criminal episode," and would thus be inconsistent with the intent of the 
Single Criminal Episod_e Statute. Id. 
State v. Ireland: The Court cited Cornish in rejecting a similar challenge 
in Ireland, 570 P.2d at 1207. Ireland pulled a gun on a h·ooper during a 
h·affic stop, stole the h·ooper' s revolver, and locked hiin in the trunk of the 
pah·ol car. Id. at 1206. Shortly thereafter, Ireland "picked up two hitchikers, 
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showed them the revolver," told them what he done, and said they "need 
not stay in the car with him." Id. Ireland then drove to a neighboring 
county, and, after noticing that he was being followed by a pah·ol car, took 
the hitchhikers hostage. Id. Ireland was later apprehended at a roadblock. 
Id. The State separately convicted him for aggravated robbery of the 
trooper's revolver and for kidnapping the hitchhikers. Id. 
On appeal fron1 the aggravated robbery conviction, Ireland argued 
that the two cases should have been h·ied together under the Single 
Criminal Episode Statute. Id. This Court disagreed: "In this case there was 
a distinct difference in tilne (that necessary to h·avel some 65 1niles), location 
(two separa te counties), and the criminal objective of robbery was entirely 
different frmn that of kidnapping which was totally disconnected in time, 
place or purpose." Id. at 1207. Moreover, the "robbery conviction was 
based on the theft of a revolver which was a completed offense at the time it 
was taken[.]" Id. And the "evidence clearly support[ed] the conclusion that 
the hitchhikers were picked up merely as such and that the criminal 
objective of taking them as hostages was not adopted until the 'necessity' 
thereof arose, i.e. when apprehension lomned ilnminent at the roadblock." 
Id. 
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The Court also rejected Ireland's argument that all of his conduct was 
"directed toward" the single criminal objective of "escape." Id. While 
Ireland's escape constituted "an explanation, the facts adequately 
support[ed] the h·ial court's determination that two separate and distinct 
offenses were con1111itted." Id. The Court declined to adopt Ireland's broad 
interpretation of the Single Criminal Episode Statute for the same reason it 
rejected Cornish's broad interpretation-it "would serve only to torture" 
the statutes' "clear wordis1g to afford him the advantage of a single felony 
conviction." Id. 
Tohnson v. Hupp: In Hupp, as in Cornish and Ireland, the Court once 
again declined to adopt a broad construction of single crimiJ.1.al episode. 
Hupp moved unsuccessfully to dismiss a citation for drunk driving after the 
l-rial court" accepted guilty pleas on three other citations issued at the same 
time for driving (a) without a license ... ; (b) without a regish·ation 
certificate ... , and (c) without a safety sticker." 606 P.2d at 254. On appeal 
fro1n the denial of a petition for an extraordinary writ, this Court rejected 
Hupp' s argmnent that the DUI citation should be dismissed because all four 
offenses were "closely related to and 'incident' to the 'single criminal 
objective' of driving his car illegally." Id. Rather, this Court held that the 
offenses were "con1.n1.itted at different times and were entirely unrelated to 
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each other." Id. Thus, Hupp's conviction for the other driving-related 
offenses did not preclude his subsequent prosecution on the drunk-driving 
citation under the Single Criminal Episode Statute. Id. 
Cornish, Ireland, and Hupp, show that this Court has interpreted the 
Single Cri1ninal Episode Statute to require more than some external or 
visual connection between crilnes to mandate joinder. Indeed, the auto 
theft and consequent failure to s top offenses i11 Cornish, the aggravated 
robbery and kidnapping in Ireland, and certainly, the driving-related 
offenses in Hupp, can all be said to have some arguable connection in their 
commission, but this Court declined to hold that any one of those 
connections sufficed to establish that the offenses shared a single criminal 
objective, or constituted a single criminal episode such that they were 
required to be joined. Rather, these cases show the Court's refusal to 
recognize a si11gle criminal episode where the offenses at issue are not 
closely related in time, i.e., nearly contemporaneous, and where the elements 
of the underlying crilnil1al statutes are different- and thus usually implicate 
different cri1ninal objectives. 
State v . Bair: Bair is the only case where the si11gle-cril11i11al-episode 
lin1ita tion was held to bar a subsequent prosecution. See 671 P.2d a t 203. 
But Bair no less supports tha t the Single Criminal Episode Statute is 
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narrowly drawn and interpreted. Investigators in Bair found a cache of 
stolen guns in Bair's home and charged hi1n with theft in one case and with 
two counts of retaining stolen property in a separate case. Id. at 203-04. 
After a jury acquitted Bair of theft, he moved unsuccessfully to dismiss the 
retaining stolen property charges. Id. at 205. 
On appeal, this Court reversed, holding Bair' s acquittal on the theft 
charge barred prosecution for two counts of retaining. Id. at 208. The Court 
recognized at the outset of its analysis that if the "receipt of the various 
stolen guns occurred on only one occasion, it definitely satisfied the 'closely 
related in time' requirement of the single crilninal episode statute, as well as 
the 'single criminal objective' requirement thereof; whereas, if the receipt 
occurred on several occasions, such requiren1ents are clearly not satisfied." 
Id. at 206 (emphasis added). The problen1 in Bair was that the evidence did 
not establish that Bair in fact "received the various stolen guns on separate 
occasions." Id. at 207. 
Rather, the evidence showed only that the stolen guns were brought 
into Bair' s house on a single occasion. Id. Both the State and the trial court 
mistakenly assumed that evidence the guns were "actually 'taken' on three 
separate occasions" also showed that Bair received the guns at separate 
occasions. Id. But "proof of the date of the actual 'taking' [did] not 
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necessarily establish the date of 'receipt' for purposes of ... receiving stolen 
property." Id. Thus, absent any evidence that Bair actually received or 
retained the stolen guns at different times, Bair's acquittal on the prior theft 
charge barred his later trial on the retaining charges under the Single 
Criminal Episode Stah1te. Id. Because there was evidence of only one act of 
receiving or retaining the stolen guns, the theft and retaining charges were 
necessarily "closely related in tim.e and pursuant to a single criminal 
objective." Id. at 208. Consequently, the single-criminal-episode lim.itation 
barred Bair' s subsequent prosecution on the retaining counts. Id. 
The result in Bair was thus driven by the State's failure to prove that 
Bair received stolen property on more than one occasion. Id. at 207. If there 
had been evidence of separate ac ts of receiving the stolen guns in Bair, this 
Court would have held that each act of receiving was not only separated in 
time, but had its own criminal objective, meaning Bair could have been 
separately prosecuted for the theft and re taining charges. Id. at 206-207; 
accord State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah 1986). 
Given the above, the upshot here is that this Court's clai1n-preclusion 
cases-including Bair - support that the single criminal episode analysis is 
fac t and context specific, and that this Court has consistently declined to 
adopt a broad construction of the phrase. 
-37-
Although Ireland, Cornish, Hupp, and Bair are the most relevant to the 
claim. preclusion issue here, this Court has also considered the term II single 
crilninal episode" in severance or prejudice cases, and in multiplicity cases 
implicating double jeopardy. Review of these cases similarly supports that 
this Court has consistently interpreted the term narrowly. 
Section 77-8a-1 now governs pern1issive joil1der or severance and 
prejudice, and it does not use the term II single criminal episode." See Point 
I.A.1., above. But a fonner version did, see section 77-35-9(a), and it is that 
version which governed the severance issue in Germonto, 868 P.2d 50. This 
Court also considered the tenn II single crimil1al episode" i11 another 
severance case, State v . Mead, 2001 UT 58, 27 P.3d 1115, but the Court also 
acknowledged that the severance issue there was ultimately governed b y 
section 77-8a-1(1), which no longer employs the tenn. See 2001 UT 58, if if 57-
58. Although the discussion of the phrase II single crimi11al episode" in Mead 
is arguably dicta, that case no less provides a helpful perspective. 
State v. Gennonto: Germonto was convicted for murdering and 
robbing 85-year-old Gilbert Lisonbee, and for forgil1g a check taken fron1 
Lisonbee' s checkbook that Gennonto II attempted to cash a t several locations 
before succeedi11g at Mr. Lisonbee' s bank" later that san1e day. 868 P.2d at 
53-54. On appeal, Gennonto argued that the forgery should have been 
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severed from the 1nurder and robbery charges because it was not part of the 
same criminal episode. Id. at 54. The Court disagreed. Id. at 59. "First, the 
forgery occurred ahnost immediately after the robbery and homicide and 
hence was closely related in time." Id. (emphasis added). Additionally, the 
three offenses shared the sa1ne criminal objective, "namely - to obtain 
property of value fron1 Mr. Lisonbee." Id. 
The Court in Germonto expressly noted that its finding of a single 
criminal episode was consistent with both Cornish and Ireland-where it 
declined to find the crin1e sprees at issue constituted single criminal 
episodes. The Court en1phasized that in Cornish, it had "[taken] care to 
avoid a rigid rule mandating joinder whenever a defendant conunits a 
crime to avoid arrest for prior criminal activity," but that Cornish did not 
"preclude" the Court "from concluding that under some circumstances," 
like those in Gennonto, "joinder 1nay be proper." Id. at 60. As for Ireland, the 
Court emphasized that the aggravated robbery and kidnapping at issue 
"had distinct differences in time (that necessary to drive sixty five 1niles), 
location (two different coun ties), and purpose." Id. In Gennonto, however, 
the facts showed a "closeness in time, location, and purpose" that all 
supported the existence of a single crilninal objective - obtaining a single 
victin1' s property. Id. 
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Germonto also distinguished the result in another severance case, 
Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325. As noted, unlike Germonto, Gotfrey was decided 
· under a version of permissive joinder that did not incorporate the phrase 
"single criminal episode." See Gotfrey, 598 P.2d at 1328 (Section "77-21-31, 
U.C.A. 1953 permits the charging of several crimes in a single indictment or 
information when they, ' . . . are of the same or similar character, or are 
based on the sa1ne act or transaction, or on two or more acts or h·ansactions 
connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.'"). 
Again, Gotfrey held that the two counts of rape and one count of sodmny on 
a child at issue should have been severed because "the two rape charges 
ste1nmed fro1n incidents occurring several n1onths apart with different 
victims," and "the sodomy charge was a separate and distinct offense with 
different elements." Germonto, 868 P.2d at 60 (citing Gotfrey, 598 P.2d at 
1328). "The facts in Gotfrey [were thus] quite different from" those in 
Germonto, "where the offenses occurred within a matter of hours, involved 
the sa1ne victiln, and were both ... part of an effort to acquire Mr. 
Lisonbee's property." Germon.to, 868 P.2d at 60. 
State v. Mead: The Court also considered the phrase "single crim.inal 
episode," albeit in dicta, in Mead. 2001 UT 58, i[,f 57-58. Mead solicited his 
cousin to kill his wife, but la ter killed her himself. See generally, id. at if if 3-
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15. After Mead was charged with murder and criminal solicitation, he 
rn.oved to sever the charges. Id. at if25. The trial court denied the motion, 
ruling that the charges constituted a single criminal episode, and that Mead 
would not be unfairly prejudiced by joinder. Id. at if 54. 
On appeal, Mead argued that the h·ial court should have granted his 
motion to sever the charges "because (1) the two offenses were not part of a 
single criminal episode" as defined in "rule 9.5 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, and (2) because he was unfairly prejudiced by joinder 
in violation of section 77-8a-1."3 Id. This Court disagreed, holding that 
Mead's argument was ultimately "unavailing" because severance was 
governed by section 77-8a-1, not rule 9.5 or section 76-1-401.4 Mead, 2001 UT 
58, if 57. Nevertheless, the Court also rejected Mead's argu111ent that the 
3Rule 9.5 incorporates section 76-1-401 as follows: 
Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints, citations, or 
infonna tions charging multiple offenses, ... and arising from a 
single criminal episode as defined by Section 76-1-401, shall be 
filed in a single court that has jurisdiction of the charged 
offense with the highest possible penally of all the offenses 
charged. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 9.5(1)(a). 
4Because Mead did not contest "that the murder and solicitation 
counts were 'alleged to have been part of a co1runon scheme or plan,"' the 
Court considered only the question of prejudice under section 77-8a-1(4)(a). 
Id. at if 59 (quoting section 77-8a-1(1)(b)). 
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murder and solicitation charges constituted a single criminal episode under 
rule 9.5 and section 76-1-401. Mead, 2001 UT 58, ~56. Mead held that 
although the crimes at issue were committed weeks apart, they were part of 
a single cri1nil1.al episode because they shared "an identical cri1ninal 
objeclive: the death of [Mead's wife]." Id. AccordiJ.1.gly, "the passage of 
1nere weeks [was] neglible." Id. 
The Court also distinguished Cornish and Ireland-cases in which it 
declined to find the crimes at issue were part of a siJ.1.gle cri1ninal episode. 
Id. at ,r56,n.10. The Court explained that neither Cornish nor Ireland 
iJ.1.volved a "clear, single crhninal objective," the absence of which 
"heightened the necessity of the ti1ning element" h1 those cases. Id. 
However, because the murder and solicitation charges in Mead "were 
manifestations of a sh1gle, clear, crimil1.al objective" -i.e., killing Mead's 
wife-" the tilning between the two incidents [was] not as crucial." Id. 
Given the above, this Court has held that multiple, distiJ.1.ct offenses 
constitute a sil1gle criminal episode where they pertain to a sil1gle victin1. 
whether or not they are also substantially, closely related i11. time, see Mead, 
2001 UT 58, il56,n.10 (crimes involving single victiln separated by "several 
weeks"), and Germont-o, 868 P.2d at 60 (crimes i11.volvil1.g sh1.gle victi1n 
separated by 111.ere "hours"). But a single criminal episode is less likely to 
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exist where more than one victim is concerned and the crimes are not 
closely related in ti1ne-i.e., separated by no more than one day or even a 
few hours. See, Bair, 671 P.2d at 203; Hupp, 606 P.2d at 254; Cornish, 571 P.2d 
at 577-578, and Ireland, 570 P.2d at 1207. 
That being said, this Court has recognized a single criminal episode 
involving multiple victi1ns in multiplicity cases, where the question is 
whether the "same act" amounted to n1ore than one offense. State v. 
Rasabout, 2013 UT App 71, if 10, 299 P.3d 625. See, e.g., State v. Porter, 705 
P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah 1985) (burglary of laundry room and separate 
aparln1ent in same building at same time constituted single criminal 
episod e, but "provision in section 76-1-402(1) against double punish1nent" 
did not apply where crimes were dis tinct from each other); James, 631 P.2d 
at 855-56 (simultaneous kidnapping of five drugstore customers 
"constituted separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode," but 
provision barring double punishment did not apply where James 
"c01nmitted an offense agains t each of his hostages"). While the existence of 
n1ore than one victiln would ordinarily point to 1nore than one criminal 
objective, the nearly contemporaneous nature of the offenses in cases like 
Porter and James 1nakes the1n similar to cases involving a single victim, or "a 
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clear, single criminal objective," and thus compel a different result. Mead, 
2001 UT 58, if56,n.10.5 
Given the Court's interpretation of the phrase "single criminal 
episode" in the above cases - this Court consistently interprets the phrase 
narrowly. Even though the Court has recognized that a single crilninal 
episode may involve 1nultiple victims, it has done so only when the crimes 
were substantially contemporaneous, e.g., Porter, James, and Schroyer. 
The court of appeals' narrow interpretation of a single criminal 
episode is consistent with this Court's interpretation. The court of appeals' 
5This Court's interpretation of the aggravated murder statute, Utah 
Code Aim. § 76-5-202 (West 2015), is consistent. That statute authorizes a 
charge of aggravated murder based on broader circmnstances than a single 
criminal episode, e.g., "the hon1icide was cmmnitted incident to one act, 
scheme, course of conduct, or crhninal episode during which lwo or 1nore 
persons were killed, or during which the actor attempts to kill one or more 
persons in addition to the victim who was killed." Utah Code Am1. § 76-5-
202(1)(b). But to the extent the Court has recognized a single crhninal 
episode in this context, it has done so only where the crimes were nearly 
contemporaneous. See, e.g., State v. Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, ,r 15, 44 P.3d 730 
(upholding aggravated murder conviction where murder and attempted 
murder occurred "within five to ten minutes of each other" and atte1npted 
murder was cormnitted to avoid responsibility for murder); State v. Alvarez, 
872 P.2d 450, 459 (Utah 1994) (upholding aggravated murder conviction 
where two murders were c01n1nitted during five minutes of fighting and 
were linked by objective of unlawfully ren1oving uninvited guests, "which 
could have, and did, result in the intentional deaths of two persons"); State 
v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050, 1052, 1054 (Utah 1987) (upholding aggravated 
murder conviction where two homicides were com1nitted within 
approxin1ately an hour and half period and were motivated by objective of 
avoiding liability for paternity support). 
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has expressly applied a narrow interpretative model to the Sin.gle Criminal 
Episode Statute beginning over twenty years ago, in a handful of claim-
preclusion cases, including Strader, 902 P.2d 638; Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, West 
Valley Cif:IJ v. Parkinson, 2014 UT App 140, 329 P.3d 833, and now, Rushton, 
2015 UT App 170. And it implicitly applied a narrow construction of the 
statute in Keppler, 1999 UT App 89, ,14, 976 P.2d 99 (no single criminal 
episode where Keppler possessed methamphetamine and marijuana pipe 
"at same ti1ne and in the same location" because objectives for possessing 
the two types of contraband were dissimilar). 
In any event, the court of appeals' narrow perspective in Strader, 
Selzer, and Parkinson did not necessarily drive its rejection of the defendants' 
arguments in those cases, i.e., that a prior prosecution precluded a later 
prosecution. Rather, in each case, the court of appeals' focused on the 
totality of the circumstances and the different criminal objectives for the 
offenses at issue. See Parkinson, 2014 UT App 140, ili[7-9 (no single criminal 
episode where domestic violence crilnes had different objective-"harming 
or frightening" victim-than crimes "stemming from" later "car chase" that 
"were motivated by Parkinson's objective of eluding police"); Selzer, 2013 
UT App 3, ilif26-27 (no single criminal episode where objective of sexual 
assault was sexu al gratifica tion and d01nination of victim, and later physical 
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assault of same victi1n resulted fro1n Selzer' s "just being in a rage"); Strader, 
902 P.2d at 643 (no single criminal episode where "only possible nexus" 
between offenses of drug possession and giving false identification to an 
officer was Sh·ader' s "intent to avoid arrest" on other charges, and giving of 
false identification did nothing to absolve, explain or mitigate drug offense; 
rather, it was "an ongoing and routine course of conduct with Sh·ader"). 
The court of appeals' invocation of a narrow interpretive 1nodel is consistent 
with a plain language analysis.6 
That is no less h·ue of this case. While the court of appeals' again 
expressly employed a narrow interpretative model, it did not say that it saw 
this as a close case that was ultimately pushed in one direction by its 
"narrow perspective." 2015 UT App 170, if13. Rather, the court 1nore 
broadly (and definitively) sh·essed that it saw the tax crimes and the wage 
crin1es as separate criminal episodes because "the crimes in each case" were 
6Defendant argues that the court of appeals' narrow interpreta tive 
model in claim-preclusion cases "embeds a method for disparate treahnent 
of litigants in its statutory consh·uction" where tha t court purports to apply 
an expansive interpretation of the Single Criminal Episode Statute in 
severance and pennissive joinder cases. Pet.Br.41; see also generally, Rushton, 
2015 UT App 170, if'if9-15. But as shown, the phrase "single crirn.inal 
episode" is no longer relevant to pennissive joinder or severance, and h as 
not been since the Legislature enacted section 77-Sa-1 in 1990. See Point 
I.A.I., above. In any event, as shown, Utah courts consistently interpret the 
phrase narrowly in all its applications. 
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"entirely separate." Rushton, 2015 UT App 170, ,r20 (emphasis added). As 
will be shown below, the court of appeals reached the right conclusion 
where the tax and wage crimes involved violations of different statutes, h ad 
different kinds of victims, and largely occurred over different time periods, 
and had different objectives. 
C. The court of appeals' correctly held that the tax and wage 
crimes did not arise out of the same criminal episode and 
were thus not required to be charged in a single information. 
In light of the foregoin g discussion, and analyzing the fac ts here, the 
court of appeals correctly held that Defendant's tax and wage crilnes did 
not arise out of the same criminal episode. See generally Rushton, 2015 UT 
App 170, ,r,r20-26. Agail1., the tax and wage crimes were only part of a 
single crilninal episode if they were both "closely related in time" and part 
of" a single crimil1.al episode." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401. This Court may 
affirm under either one- or both- of these single-criminal-episode 
elements. 
1. This Court can affirm on the alternative ground that the 
tax and wage crimes were not closely related in time. 
Although not specifically addressed by the court of appeals, this 
Court 1nay affirm on the alternative ground that the tax and wage crimes 
were not "closely related in tiine." Utah Code Ann.§ 76-1-401. 
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In the l-rial court, the State argued that Defendant's tax and wage 
offenses were not closely related in time, where the tax crimes commenced 
in 2005 and extended into 2008, and the wage crimes co1TI111enced in late 
2008 and extended through 2009. See R391:20-22. The trial court disagreed 
and concluded that they were. See R319-20. 
On appeal, the State argued that the court of appeals could affirm on 
the alternative ground that the tax and wage criines were not closely related 
in time, where that ground was raised and argued in the h·ial court, and 
review of the h·ial court's interpretation of the statute would be "non.-
deferential." See Aple.Br.17,n.1. It is well-settled that an appellate court 
may affirm the ruling of a lower court on alternative grounds when the 
ground or theory is "apparei1t on the record." Francis v. State, 2010 UT 62, 
iflO, 248 P.3d 44. Because the court of appeals ultimately affirn1ed on the 
basis that Defendant "did not have a single criminal objective" in 
committing his tax and wage crimes, it did not specifically address the 
timing issue, "other than to consider it as part of the context ii1 which the 
crin1es took place," and to observe that there were "some temporal 
distinctions" between the two sche1nes. Rushton, 2015 UT App 170, 
ir~[8,21n.9. Given that this issue ultin1ately involves non-deferential review 
of a statute, and given that this ground w as raised and argued in both of the 
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lower courts, the State maintains that affirmance on this ground is 
particularly appropriate here.7 
As shown, this Court's cases support that for separate or distinct 
offenses to constitute a single criminal episode they n1ust be substantially, 
closely related in time-i.e., nearly conte1nporaneous. See Point LB., above. 
For example, in Ireland, this Court held that Ireland's crimes- taking a 
revolver and, shortly after that, taking hostages-constituted two separate 
criminal episodes. 570 P.2d at 1206-07. With respect to the tilning element, 
the Court held tha t the aggravated robbery was not "closely related in time" 
to the kidnappings, given that "there was a dis tinct difference in time" 
between the crimes-na1nely, the time "necessary to h·avel some 65 1niles." 
Id. at 1207; see also Cornish, 571 P.2d at 577-78 (no single criminal episode 
where offenses "were separated in time by approximately one full day"). 
7The court of appeals observed in a footnote that the State did "not 
directly challenge" the h·ial court's "finding" that the two schemes were 
closely related in tiine. Id. at ~8,n.5. Contrary to the court of appeals' 
characterization, however, the h·ial court's timing ruling was a legal 
conclusion, not a factual finding. See R391:20-22; R319-20. Moreover, it was 
h·eated as such by both parties. See Aple.Br.17,n.1; Aplt.Rply.Br.5-9 
(characterizing timing ruling as a "conclusion"). 
The only disagreement in the court of appeals was whether the tax 
and wage cri111es overlapped at all il"l 2008. Compare Aple.Br.19 (arguing 
offenses "did not overlap" in 2008) and Aplt.Rpy.Br.8,n .4 (arguing wage 
schen1e offenses occurred during "[a]ll of 2008"). The State conceded in oral 
argument that some of the crin1es overlapped for six months i11 2008. See 
oral argu1nent il"l the court of appeals, 15 January 2015. 
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But in James, where James affected five separate kidnappings of drug-store 
customers virtually simultaneously, this Court found the kidnappings to be 
part of a single criminal episode. See 631 P.2d at 855-56. 
However, as noted, the single crin1inal episode analysis is ulthnately 
fact and context specific. Neither this Court nor the court of appeals has 
considered the "closely related h1 time" element in the context of tax or 
wage crimes. But this Court has considered it in what, so far as the State 
can tell, is the closest analogue- receiving stolen property. See Bair, 671 
P.2d at 206. As shown, Bair held that separate counts of theft by receiving 
stolen property are "closely related h1 time" for purposes of the Single 
Criminal Episode Statute only if the defendant received the stolen property 
on a single occasion. Id. But "if the receipt occurred on several occasions," 
the timing requirement is "clearly not satisfied" and the defendant can 
appropriately be h·ied in separate cases. Id.; accord Tarafa, 720 P.2d at 1370. 
This is the case here as well. The infonna tion in the tax case charged 
misconduct from 2005 through the first two quarters of 2008. See R179-185. 
Defendant ultimately admitted failing to file tax returns "[o]n or about April 
15th of 2006, 2007[,] and 2008," and engaging in a pattern of unlawful 
activity "[d]uring years 2006 and 2008 inclusive." R168. By conh·ast, the 
information in the wage case alleged that the monies were withheld durh1g 
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the calendars years 2008 and 2009, R187-195, and when Defendant finally 
pleaded guilty, the plea affidavit further narrowed the range to October 
2008 to 2009. R226-227. 
Given the timing element as in terpreted in Bair and this Court's other 
cases, and even assuming "overlap" between Defendant's tax and wage 
crimes in 2008, Rushton, 2015 UT App 170, if21,n.9, the crilnes were not 
"closely related in time." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401. First, Defendant 
cannot show that his tax and wages crimes were "closely related in time" 
when the crimes were several years apart at their outer boundaries. Id. This 
is consistent with the Utah Crim.inal Code Commentary, where the preparer 
observed that passing forged checks "over a period of several weeks" 
would not constitute a single criminal episode, even though the forger "had 
a single criminal objective, i.e., the obtaining of money by forgery," because 
"the offenses would not be closely related in. time." Utah Criminal Code 
Commentary 144. And second, even though the cri1nes overlapped for a 
time in 2008, the evidence did not support a finding that they were 
committed substantially contemporaneously on any given day during that 
time. Defendant's tax and wage cri1nes were not therefore part of a single 
crilninal episode. 
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Defendant nevertheless argues that the timing element is less 
i1nportant here because his tax crimes and wage criines were part of an 
"' overarching scheme' of continuous conduct from 2006 through 2009"; and, 
both of sets of crimes "also necessarily require[ d] time to occur, as taxes are 
(un)paid aimually, and wages and retirement contributions are paid on 
monthly schedules." Pet.Br.20,n.8. In support, Defendant cites a murder 
case, Mead, 2001 UT 58, 156,n.10, and two embezzlement cases, State v. 
Crosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996), and State v. Gibson, 37 Utah 330, 108 P. 349 
(1910). See Pet.Br.20,n.8. 
Defendant's reliance on Mead is unavailing because, as shown, the 
only reason this Court held that the "passage of mere weeks" between the 
murder and criminal solicitation counts "was not as crucial" in that case 
was because the two counts shared "a clear, single criminal objective" - i.e., 
to kill Mead's wife. 2001 UT 58, 'if56,n.10. But unlike Mead, and, as will be 
shown in greater detail below, this case involves multiple victi1ns and 
1nultiple criminal objectives over a course of years; therefore the timing of 
the offenses re1nains important under the statute. 
Defendant's reliance on the embezzlen1ent cases is si1nilarly 
unavailing because, unlike the tax and wage crimes here, embezzlement is 
"one continuous transaction" or a single-continuing offense involving a 
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single vic tim. State v. Crosby, 927 P.3d 638, 645 (Utah 1996); ·see also State v. 
Gibson, 108 P. 349, 350 (Utah 1910). The question in Crosby and Gibson was 
whether the defendants should have been charged with multiple lesser 
counts of theft or a single count of embezzlement, which is subject to greater 
punishment. Crosby, 927 P.2d at 645-646; Gibson, 108 P. at 350. Unlike those 
defendants, Defendant was charged with 1nultiple separate crimes against 
multiple separate victims that occurred over several years in both the tax 
information and the wage inforn1ation and the only question is whether the 
separate tax crhnes were part of the same single crimh1al episode as the 
separate crilnes constituting the wage offenses. 
Defendant also notes that the State regularly prosecutes multi-count 
financial crime cases that c01nmonly occur over a course of years. See 
Pet.Br.31,n.11. But as shown, this is no less than what the permissive 
joinder statute encourages- but does not require -when offenses are 
"connected together in thefr cormnission," or part of a "conunon sche1ne or 
plan." Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-1(1). 
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2. This Court should also affirm because the tax and wage 
crimes were not i_ncident to the accomplishment of a 
single criminal objective. 
In any event, Defendant must also show that the tax and wage crimes 
were "incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criininal 
objective." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401. 
Defendant argues that a "single criminal objective" motivated both 
the tax and wage offenses here- i.e., the misappropriation of funds via 
Fooptube- and that the State was therefore required to join the offenses in a 
single information.8 Pet.Br.28-33. In support, Defendant argues that he 
"would have had difficulty arguing the prejudice necessary to sever them," 
8In the court of appeals, Defendant argued that his only objective was 
to keep Fooptube afloat. Aplt.Br.25; R200-201. Before sentencing, however, 
the trial court asked for evidence of whether Defendant's fmnily had been 
paid w hile working for him. R287. In response, the State provided 
evidence that although 95 employees had filed wage claims with the Utah 
Labor Commission, none of Defendant's six irmnediate fa1nily members 
who worked for Fooptube had ever filed a claim. R292-95. The State also 
included notes from an investigator's interview with Fooptube's office 
manager, who had alluded that Defendant used Fooptube money for 
personal expenses that included buying a boat, finishing his basement, and 
paying for priva te school expenses of a grandchild. R299. 
Defendant's wife-who, as noted, avoided conviction for tax fraud 
only because of Defendant's plea deal - subsequently filed an affidavit 
disputing some (but not all) of the State's claims. R311. The trial court 
ultimately did not resolve this factual dispute. On appeal, the State argued 
that the cour t of appeals need not do so either because even Defendant's 
proffered explanation for his conduct does not suffice under the statute. 
Aple.Br.19,n.2. 
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if they had been joined. Pet.Br.33 (citing section 77-8a-1(4)(a)). But while a 
motive to misappropriate funds via Fooptube may well connect Defendant's 
1nisconduct in the tax and wage criines, it is not at all clear that it would be 
enough of a connection to support even permissive joinder under section 77-
8a-1 (1 ), let alone to man.date joinder under section 76-1-401.9 In any event, 
the facts of this case illustrate that there was not in fact a single crin1.inal 
objective. 
Contrary to Defendant's argument, his objective of misappropriating 
money in both the tax and wage cases via Fooptube is arguably not a 
specific enough connection to support even pennissive joinder. 10 See 
9Contrary to Defendant's argument-and assuming the State could 
have charged both the tax case and the wage case in a single information-
Defendant would more than likely have succeeded on any motion to sever 
the wage case from the tax case under section 77-8a-1(4)(a), on the basis the 
"offenses were completely distinct wrongs and that he would be prejudiced 
if they were all tried together." Strader, 902 P.2d at 641. 
10It is not even clear that "misappropriation" can be an objective of tax 
fraud . As Defendant notes, misappropriation means applying "another's 
property or 1noney dishonestly to one's own use." Black's Law Dictionary 
(10th ed. 2014); see also Pet.Br.28 (quoting Black's). But it is not a t all clear 
that in failing to file his tax returns, Defendant misappropriated 1noney 
belonging to another- i.e., the govermnent-as opposed to failing to remit 
his own money to the government in the form of a tax. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-8-1101(1)(c). Likewise, although the e1nployees had earned the wages, 
it is not clear that in failing to pay his e1nployees, Defendant 
1nisappropriated money belonging to another-i.e., his employees-as 
opposed to failing to give then1 his own money in the fonn of a salary. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-12. 
rr 
- :>:>-
Pet. Br.33. At least one court interpreting a pennissive joinder provision 
similar to section 77-8a-1(1), has rejected joinder based on a similarly "vague 
thematic connection among offenses." See Buchannan, 930 F.Supp. at 662. 
Moreover, although the tax crimes and wage offenses may have overlapped 
for a tin1e in 2008, they were not "connected together in their commission," 
section 77-8al(l), as that term has been interpreted. For example, the tax 
cri1nes did not at all precipitate or facilitate the later wage crilnes. See 
Benson, 2014 UT App 92, ,113 (recognizing crilnes may be permissively 
joined "where a later crime is 'precipitated by' an earlier one, such as where 
the later crime facilitates flight after the earlier one"); accord Kirk, 266 P.3d at 
1265 (charges properly, pennissively joined where "one charge precipitates 
the second charge"). Put another way, the evidence does not establish that 
Defendant stole his employees' wages in 2008 and 2009 in order to cover-up 
the tax fraud he ad1nits com1nitting between 2006 and 2008. Instead, while 
he was clearly h·yiI1g to unlawfully evade his financial obligations in both 
cases, he did so using different-not c01nmon-schen1es that were entirely 
fr1dependent of each other, even if they overlapped for a time. See Rushton, 
2015 UT App 170, 1f21 (recogniziI1.g "Rushton's actions iI1. stealing fr01n 
employees did not further his objective of stealing from the government"). 
It is thus questionable whether the cases could even be properly 
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characterized as a "c01mnon sche1ne or plan," let alone as arising out of a 
single criminal objective. See Kirk, 266 P.3d at 1265 (considering whether 
"overlapping proof" would be required at h·ial); Floyd, 558 S.E.2d at 239 
(considering whether there were "c01mnon issues of fact" between the 
cases). 
But even if a broad objective like 1nisappropriation is enough of a 
connection to support permissive joinder, it is not sufficient to mandate 
joinder under the Single Criminal Episode Statute. As shown in Point I.A.3., 
above, the Single Criminal Episode Statute and the pennissive joinder 
statutes cannot be interpreted synonymously without desh·oying the 
pennissive joinder statute. Nor has this Court recognized a similarly broad 
objective in any of its claim-preclusion cases. Rather, as shown, this Court 
typically focuses its analysis of the single-criminal-objective bar on the 
elements of the underlying crilninal statutes at issue. See Point LB., above. 
Again, in Ireland, for example, this Court held that the robbery and 
kidnappings there were not part of a single cri1ninal episode because-
focusing on the nature of the crin1es themselves - "the criminal objective of 
robbery was entirely different than of kidnapping." 570 P.2d at 1207. And 
in Keppler, 1999 UT App 89, ilil4-7, the cou rt of appeals likewise held tha t 
where Keppler was found in possession of both a 1narijuana pipe and 
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methamphetamine, he could be charged in separate cases for those two 
offenses. Keppler focused on the elements of the offenses, noting that these 
were "discrete crimes" that, by statute, involved possession of different 
kinds of illegal substances. Id. at ,r6. 
Here, focusing on the underlying criminal statutes at issue, the tax 
case was built around Defendant's efforts to avoid paying taxes to the 
goverrunent. See Rl67 (citing e.g., section 76-8-1101). Thus, properly 
viewed, the "single crhninal objective" of the tax offenses was tax evasion. 
See Rushton, 2015 UT App 170, if20 (recognizing the tax crimes involved 
"failing to pay taxes and falsifying withholding-tax state1nents and W-2s"). 
By conh·ast, the wage case was built around Defendant's failure to pay 
employee wages earned and to remit agreed a1nounts for retirement 
benefits. See R225 (citing e.g., section 76-6-513 (unlawful dealing of 
property by a fiduciary); section 34-28-12 (failure to pay wages)). Thus, the 
criminal objective in the wage case was to receive services without paying 
for the1n. See Rushton, 2015 UT App 170, ,i20 (recognizing wage sche1ne 
involved "fail[ing] to pay earned wages and to re1nit withheld retire1nent 
savings to the designated retirement funds"). 
Given this Court's and the court of appeals' cases interpreting the 
Single Criminal Episode Statute and the differing statutory sche1nes here at 
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issue, the fact that Defendant may have had an overarching objective to not 
pay legal obligations in both cases is simply not specific enough to require 
joinder. As recognized in Rushton, Defendant's "argument that the crimes 
were linked by his ultimate goal of unlawfully appropriating the money of 
others views his 'objective' from too elevated a vantage point." 2015 UT 
App, ,r21. Indeed, there are countless ways in which criminals try to 
unlawfully obtain money from others. Some use white collar schemes; 
others use violence or force. Some do it blatantly, robbing strangers in 
broad daylight; others do it surreptitiously, skimm.ing s1nall margins off 
corporate books. Some steal from employers; others cheat employees of 
wages earned. Some evade taxes owed to the government; others steal from 
family. 
But the "criminal plan of obtaining as much money as possible is too 
broad an objective to constitute a single crilninal goal within the meaning" 
of a joinder statute, be it pennissive or 1nandatory. State v. Bauer, 792 
N.W.2d 825, 830 (Minn. 2011) (quotations and citation 01nitted). As further 
recognized in Rushton, "[t]he narrow label of single crimil1al objective [was] 
not 1neant to encompass such a broad criminal goal because if it did, then 
almost any series of crilnes c01mnitted for the purpose of illegally obtail1ing 
1noney, say to feed a drug habit, could be described as 'single"' -and thus 
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required to be joined under the statute. 2015 UT App 170, ,r21. Therefore, 
even if the evidence did support Defendant's "claim that he had one large 
plan to swindle as much" money from as 1nany people as possible, "that 
objective is too broad to be a single criminal goal." State v. Eaton, 292 
N .W.2d 260,267 (Minn. 1980). 
The fact that Defendant allegedly intended to avoid paying legal 
obligations in both cases does not change this. For example, suppose that in 
his desire to keep his company afloat, Defendant did not stop with tax 
evasion and not paying his e1nployees. Suppose that in 2010, he also began 
surreptitiously stealing 1noney from his vendors as part of a new unlawful 
scheme. Surely that would not be a part of a single criminal episode with 
tax cri1nes that Defendant cominitted in 2005. 
Or suppose Defendant went even further - suppose that, as his 
desperation to save Fooptube increased, he robbed a bank and then 
iln1nediately used the ill-gotten money to pay con1.pany obligations. The 
fact that he intended to spend the 1noney in the same place-on Fooptube-
would not change the fact that his underlying crin1.inal objectives were 
entirely different. Again, in the tax case, the criminal objective was to evade 
taxes owed to the government; in the hypothetical bank robbery, his 
crin1.inal objective would have been to steal money fr01n a bank. 
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Returning to the two cases at issue here, the disconnect is even more 
pronounced when considered in light of how the cases would have 
proceeded if tried together. See Rushton, 2015 UT App 170, ifl3 (recognizing 
one purpose of Single Criminal Episode Statute is to avoid "inefficient or 
repetitive" prosecutions); Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, ,r22 (sa111.e). 
Here: 
• The offenses occurred at different times and involved different kinds 
of crilninal conduct. 
• The cases involved different victims: the victim in the tax case was the 
govenunent, while the victiins in the wage case were Defendant's 
employees. 
• The cases were based on different statutes with different elements. 
As a result, the two cases would have required entirely differen t sets 
of jury iI1.slTuctions. 
Ii If they had gone to h·ial, the cases would have involved different, 
non-overlappiI1.g types of evidence: 
o In the tax case, the State would have been required to put on 
detailed proof of the falsified and missing tax 1noney and tax 
docun1.ents, none of which would have been required iI1. the 
wage case. 
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o Conversely, m the wage case, the State would have been 
required to put on proof that Defendant did not pay his 
employees and diverted funds promised for their retirement 
plans, none of which would have been required in the tax case. 
• Given this, the cases would also have required entirely different kinds 
of wib1esses: 
o The tax case would have required the State to put on expert 
witnesses who could testify about Defendant's tax obligations 
and fact wib1esses who could testify about his non-payment of 
taxes between 2005 and early 2008, none of which would have 
been required in the wage case. 
· o Conversely, the wage case would have required testimony 
frmn the affected employees, witnesses who could describe 
Defendant's obligations as administrator of the retire1nent plan, 
and witnesses who could detail Defendant's nonpayment to 
that retirement plan, none of which would have been required 
in the tax case. 
When considering cases like this one, courts have refused to permit 
join.der, let alone to require it. See Buchanan, 930 F.Supp. at 663-64 (rejecting 
joinder where "the charges were brought under different statutes" 
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involving "different victims" and crhnes that "occurred in different 
locations"); State v. Clements, 649 N.E.2d 912, 913 (Ohio App. 1994) (holding 
joinder ilnproper where offenses "involved different crimes at different 
times at different locations on different dates," involving "different victims, 
different witnesses, different investigating officers[,] and co1npletely 
different evidence."). 
So too here. Defendant's crimes may have been motivated by the 
desire to keep Fooptube afloat, and both the common locale for the offenses 
m.ay well have been at Fooptube. But Defendant violated different statutes 
during different years (excepting an apparent six n1onth overlap in 2008) 
using different kinds of criminal conduct that involved different kinds of 
victims; and proof of these offenses would have involved different 
witnesses, different evidence, and different jury insh·uctions about different 
statutory elements. 
Given this, the court of appeals correctly held that Defendant was not 
unfairly harassed by the State using "successive trials for offenses stemming 
from the sa1ne criminal episode," nor was the judiciary burdened by 
"repetitious litigation." Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, if22. Instead, the State 
appropriately charged Defendant in separate cases for separate crhninal 
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conduct. This Court should accordingly affinn the court of appeal's 
opinion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
Respectfully submitted on March 9, 2016. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
flaliM. ~j}gbA 
r-JrJRIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
dounsel for Respondent 
l 
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JUDGE STEPHEN L. ROTH authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES 
JAMES Z. DA VIS and J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. concurred. 
ROTH, Judge: 
11 David M. Rushton entered a conditional guilty plea to one 
misdemeanor and two felony offenses stemming from his failure 
to pay employee wages and remit retirement withholdings while 
he owned and operated Fooptube, LLC, a computer 
programming and design company. He argues that the district 
court should have granted his motion to dismiss the charges 
because they arose from the same criminal episode as charges to 
which he had previously pleaded guilty. We affirm Rushton's 
convictions. 
State v. Rushton 
BACKGROUND 
<J.[2 In 2008, the Utah State Tax Commission began 
investigating Rushton and Fooptube on suspicion of tax evasion. 
On April 14, 2009, the State charged Rushton with six tax crimes 
alleged to have been committed during calendar years 2006, 
2007, and 2008 (the tax case). During the same time period, a 
number of Fooptube employees filed claims for w1paid wages 
v1ith the UteJ1 Labor Commission. Also at about this time; the 
United States Department of Labor's Employee Benefits Security 
Administration was investigating whether Rushton had failed to 
remit employee retirement contributions. At a review hearing in 
the tax case on May 5, 2009, Fooptube employees personally 
notified the tax commission investigator and the prosecutor of 
the wage claims. Rushton was arraigned in the tax case in 
December 2009, and in Jw1e 2010, he pleaded guilty to two 
charges pursuant to a plea agreement. 
]3 On April 20, 2011, the State filed this second case (the 
wage case) against Rushton, charging him with two second 
degree felony counts of communications fraud; two second 
degree felony counts of unlawful dealing with property by a 
fiduciary; two second degree felony counts of theft of services or, 
alternatively, twelve class A misdemeanor counts of failing to 
pay wages; and one second degree felony count of engaging in a 
pattern of unlawful activity for his failure to pay his employees 
an estimated $1.17 million in wages and his failure to remit an 
estimated $1.2 million in withheld retirement fw1ds. Rushton 
moved to dismiss, arguing that his convictions in the tax case 
barred the State from prosecuting the wage case because the 
charges in the wage case were part of the same criminal episode 
as the charges in the tax case. The district court denied Rushton' s 
motion, concluding that the two cases did not arise from a single 
criminal episode. The court explained that although the charges 
in both cases were "closely related in time," the conduct from 
which the respective charges arose was "not in furtherance of the 
same criminal objective." The court reasoned that there was not 
a single criminal objective because the "victim in the [tax] case is 
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State v. Rushton 
the state of Utah" and "[t]he issue is ... tax laws," while the 
wage case involves Rushton's alleged "defraud[ing of] his 
employees."1 After the district court denied his motion, Rushton 
entered Sery pleas2 to three counts. He now appeals the district 
court's refusal to dismiss the wage case. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
<_![ 4 Rushton challenges the district court's decision to deny 
his motion to dismiss the wage case. "A trial court's decision to 
grant or deny a motion to dismiss presents a question of law, 
1. In the tax case, Rushton pleaded guilty to one count of failure 
to render personal tax returns and one count of engaging in a 
pattern of unlawful activity. The State of Utah is the victim of 
both of those crimes. Rushton's failure to pay taxes resulted in 
the state being deprived of funds legitimately owed to it. The 
pattern of unlawful activity conviction was based in part on 
Rushton's failure "to file or truthfully file corporate tax returns 
and remit employee withholding taxes" while operating 
Fooptube. But, in filing their own tax returns, Fooptube 
employees relied on Rushton's representation that the taxes had 
been remitted to the state on their behalf. The state therefore 
"applied [credits] for the benefit of such employees" in the 
amount of "about $585,917.89." Thus, the state shouldered the 
loss from the unpaid employee taxes. 
In the wage case, the employees are the victims because 
they were not paid wages for which they had worked and their 
retirement withholdings were never remitted. 
2. A guilty plea entered pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), is conditional. It permits a defendant to 
reserve the right to appeal an issue raised in the district court, 
such as the denial of the motion to dismiss in this case, and then 
to withdraw the plea if he or she is successful on appeal. See id. 
at 938. 
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which we review for correctness." State v. Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, 
ciI 14, 294 P.3d 617 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
15 Rushton argues that in denying his motion to dismiss, the 
district court wrongly determined that the charges in the wage 
case did not arise out of the same criminal episode as the charges 
in the tax case. We conclude that the district court correctly 
denied Rushton' s motion to dismiss. 
16 Multiple charges arise from a single criminal episode if 
the conduct underlying the charges "is closely related in time 
and is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single 
criminal objective." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (LexisNexis 
2012). 3 Except under certain circumstances not relevant here, 
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode must be 
tried together when "(a) [t]he offenses are within the jurisdiction 
of a single court; and (b) [ t ]he offenses are known to the 
prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned on 
the first information or indictment." Id. § 76-1-402(2). Failure to 
comply with this mandate may bar subsequent prosecution for 
conduct arising from the same criminal episode: 
If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, a 
subsequent prosecution for the same or a different 
offense arising out of the same criminal episode is 
barred if: 
· 3. We refer to the current version of the Utah Code because the 
pertinent statutes do not differ substantively from the versions 
in effect at the time of the underlying offenses. 
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(a) the subsequent prosecution is for an offense 
that was or should have been tried under 
[section 402(2)] in the former prosecution; and 
(b) the former prosecution: 
(i) resulted in acquittal; 
(ii) resulted in conviction; 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or 
;,,rlo-rnAnt frw thA rl,:,f,:,nrl::mt th:it h:i <; nnt 
,-~n· ··- ··· ·-· ···- ----··--·· ···-· ··-· -·-. 
been reversed, set aside, or vacated and 
that necessarily required a determination 
inconsistent with a fact that must be 
established to secure conviction in the 
subsequent prosecution. 
Id. § 76-1-403(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014). "The purpose of such 
compulsory joinder is twofold: (1) to protect a defendant from 
the governmental harassment of being subjected to successive 
trials for offenses stemming from the same criminal episode; and 
(2) to ensure finality without w1duly burdening the judicial 
process by repetitious litigation." Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, 11 22 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
117 It is undisputed that the offenses in both the wage case 
and the tax case fell within the jurisdiction of the district court 
and that conduct supporting the wage case was known to the 
prosecuting attorney at the time that Rushton was arraigned on 
the tax case. 4 See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(2) (LexisNexis 
2012). It is also undisputed that the State's prosecution in the tax 
case resulted in a conviction when Rushton entered his guilty 
pleas to two counts. See id. § 76-1-403(1)(b)(ii) (LexisNexis Supp. 
2014). Thus, the only point of contention here is whether the tax 
4. The State conceded the first factor in the district court, and the 
court made the latter finding in the face of the State's opposition. 
The State, however, "does not contest" the finding on appeal. 
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case charges and wage case charges arose out of a "single 
criminal episode" because they were closely related in time and 
were incident to the attempt or accomplishment of a single 
criminal objective. See id. § 76-1-401 (LexisNexis 2012). 
<_!{8 The district court determined that the charges in each case 
did not arise from a single criminal episode because, although 
they were "closely related in time," the conduct from which the 
two sets of charges arose was "not in furtherance of the same 
criminal objective" where "the offense[s] in each case involved 
different victims." Rushton challenges the court's latter 
determination, arguing that the offenses in both cases were 
"incident to one criminal purpose, that of misappropriating 
corporate money from Fooptube." The State counters that the 
court correctly determined that the two sets of charges were not 
part of a single criminal episode because they had separate 
criminal objectives, that is, the offenses in the tax case were 
aimed at taking funds owed to the government while the 
offenses in the wage case were aimed at taking funds owed to 
the Fooptube employees. 5 The parties rely on a number of cases 
in support of their respective positions. Although all of these 
cases may help inform our decision, we consider it useful to first 
address the differing contexts in which they arose to explain 
why some are more useful than others in resolving the particular 
single criminal episode question here. 
5. The State also argues that the charges were not closely related 
in time. In doing so, however, the State does not directly 
challenge the district court's finding that they were. We do not 
specifically address the timing issue, however, other than to 
consider it as part of the context in which the crimes took place, 
because we affirm on the basis that Rushton did not have a 
single criminal objective in engaging in the conduct underlying 
each case. 
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I. Categorization of Our Precedent 
1[9 The cases cited by the parties seem to fit primarily into 
three categories: (1) cases that address whether a defendant's 
conduct could be charged as more than one offense or amounted 
to only a single offense, see, e.g., State v. James, 631 P.2d 854 (Utah 
1981); State v. Rasabout, 2013 UT App 71, 299 P.3d 625, cert. 
granted, 308 P.3d 536 (Utah 2013); State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Utah 
Ct. ADD. 1989): see also State v. Bauer. 792 N.W.2d 825 (Minn . 
.1. ..L ~ , • • 
2011); (2) cases that address whether separate offenses arguably 
arising from a single criminal episode must be tried together, see, 
e.g., West Valley CihJ v. Parkinson, 2014 UT App 140, 329 P.3d 833; 
State v. Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, 294 P.3d 617; State v. Strader, 902 
P.2d 638 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); and (3) cases that address 
whether separate offenses arguably arising from a single 
criminal episode may be tried separately, see, e.g., State v. Mead, 
2001 UT 58, 27 P.3d 1115; State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
1[10 The first category of cases addresses the constitutional 
protection against double jeopardy. Strader, 902 P.2d at 642. 
Double jeopardy prevents "a defendant from being tried more 
than once for the same crime." Id. Although the concepts of 
single criminal episode and double jeopardy are distinct, the 
double jeopardy issue has been addressed within the single 
criminal episode framework. This may be because the enactment 
of the single criminal episode statutes resulted in an "expan[sion 
of] the scope of offenses barred from multiple trials beyond the 
same offense focus in double jeopardy, to all offenses arising 
from a single criminal episode." Id. at 641 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted); State v. Sommerville, 2013 UT App 40, 
1[ 7, 297 P.3d 665 (explaining that the single criminal episode 
statutes were primarily "designed to protect a defendant from 
multiple trials for offenses that are part of a single criminal 
episode" (citation and internal quotation m arks omitted)). In 
other words, the single criminal episode statutes seem to extend 
the protection against multiple prosecutions encompassed 
within the double jeopardy doctrine from single offenses to 
separate offenses arising out a single criminal episode. It may be 
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because of this expansion that the single criminal episode 
statutes include a provision emphasizing that they are not 
intended to undermine double jeopardy protection: 
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single 
criminal action for all separate offenses arising out 
of a single criminal episode; however, when the 
same act of a defendant under a single criminal 
episode shall establish offenses which may be 
punished in different ways under different 
provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable 
under only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such provision 
bars a prosecution under any other such provision. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (LexisNexis 2012); see, e.g., Mane, 
783 P.2d at 63-65 (using this provision of the single criminal 
episode statutes in its analysis of whether there was one or more 
crimes committed). In this first category of cases, where the 
primary focus is double jeopardy, the courts have taken "a very 
narrow perspective, focusing on whether a subsequent 
prosecution is for the same offense" as the first prosecution. 6 
Strader, 902 P.2d at 642 (emphasis omitted). 
6. Though our courts have addressed single criminal episode 
concerns in cases raising double jeopardy issues, we are not 
convinced that this first category actually provides much 
guidance on single criminal episode questions such as the one 
presented here because, in the end, double jeopardy is not 
concerned with whether multiple offenses arose out of the same 
criminal episode but rather with whether particular conduct 
constitutes a single offense or multiple offenses. Because 
Rushton has relied on cases from this category and at times our 
decisions have used a single criminal episode framework as an 
analytical tool in the context of a double jeopardy issue, we 
include it within our categorization of case precedent. 
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'fill In the second category of cases, the appellate court's focus 
is on the compulsory joinder requirement established in Utah 
Code section 76-1-402(2); these cases directly address whether 
separate offenses arising from a single criminal episode must be 
prosecuted together. In these cases, the defendant's conduct 
constitutes more than one prosecutable offense and the issue is 
whether the offenses arose from a single criminal episode so as 
to bar separate prosecutions in the interest of judicial economy 
and fL11ality for the defendant. See, e.g., Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, 
'Il 22. We have concluded that this type of claim is "comparable 
to asserting double jeopardy." Strader, 902 P.2d at 642. Thus, "'it 
is appropriate to take a narrow, rather than an expansive, view 
of what [a single criminal episode] entails."' Selzer, 2013 UT App 
3, <]I 26 (alteration in original) (quoting Strader, 902 P.2d at 642). 
'Il12 Finally, in the third category of cases, appellate courts are 
concerned with whether the mandatory joinder of multiple 
charges in a single prosecution deprives one or both parties of a 
fair trial. See, e.g., Lopez, 789 P.2d at 42 (noting that severance is 
available if trying charges together would prejudice either the 
prosecution or the defense) . Consequently, there are two related 
issues that arise in these cases. The first is whether the offenses 
occurred as part of a single criminal episode so that they should 
ordinarily be tried together, and the second, which arises only if 
they did, is whether trying the charges together in the particular 
case would result in undue prejudice to either party. Strader, 902 
P.2d at 641 n.6. In this context then, "[a]n expansive 
interpretation of 'single criminal episode' is appropriate." Id. at 
641. 
'fil3 There are sound reasons for employing a narrow 
interpretation of single criminal episode in the . first two 
categories while using a more expansive interpretation in the 
third category. The single criminal episode statutes serve to 
"expand the scope of offenses barred from multiple trials 
beyond the same offense focus in double jeopardy to all offenses 
arising from a single criminal episode." Id. (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). In doing this, the legislature sought to 
promote judicial economy and to protect defendants by 
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requiring joinder into a single trial any charges ansmg from 
conduct that was close in time and done in furtherance of the 
same criminal objective. Id.; accord Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, c_rr 22. 
But these same concerns for judicial economy and protection of 
defendants simply do not arise when the conduct is not part of a 
single criminal episode because the offenses do not share an 
intertwined factual or legal history that makes separate 
prosecutions inefficient or repetitive. A narrow perspective thus 
serves to ensure that the ioinder requirement does not unduly 
, i , 
preclude prosecution for charges that do not arise out of a single 
criminal episode. 
114 On the other hand, ·when one of the parties challenges 
joinder for trial, that party is concerned about the prejudice that 
may inure to the party's position if the charges are heard 
together. An expansive view of single criminal episode allows 
the trial court to more readily balance the interest in judicial 
economy that the joinder requirement serves with the 
defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial and the State's 
interest in a fair prosecution. See State v. Strader, 902 P.2d 638, 641 
n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Moreover, "because appellate courts 
review decisions regarding joinder or severance of offenses only 
for abuse of discretion, it follows that the reviewing court would, 
as a practical matter, take a broad view of what constitutes a 
single criminal episode in that context." Id. at 641-42 (citations 
omitted). 
1{15 Given the question before us in this case-whether the tax 
offenses and wage offenses all arise from a single criminal 
episode so as to bar the prosecution in the wage case-cases in 
the second category are the most useful because they are directly 
on point. The first category of cases provides only limited 
guidance because although the cases use the same narrow 
standard for determining whether conduct arises from a single 
criminal episode, they are more directly focused on the double 
jeopardy-related question of whether the conduct constitutes a 
single offense or can legitimately be prosecuted as different 
offenses. Here, there is no dispute that Rushton' s conduct 
constituted more than one offense that could be punished under 
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multiple code prov1s10ns. The severance-related cases in the 
third category are even less instructive as they employ a much 
broader standard for assessing whether offenses arise from the 
same criminal episode because the focus is on prejudice at trial. 7 
We therefore rely primarily on the second category of cases in 
assessing whether Rushton' s charges arose from a single 
criminal episode so as to warrant compulsory joinder. 
II. Single Criminal Objective 
<]I16 The only issue before us in assessing whether the tax case 
and the wage case arose from a single criminal episode is 
whether the conduct underlying those charges was "incident to 
7. While no prior case appears to have explicitly categorized the 
existing case law as we have done here, Utah appellate courts 
have long utilized these categories in analyzing the questions 
that arise under the single criminal episode statutes. See West 
Valley CihJ v. Parkinson, 2014 UT App 140, <JI<JI 6-8, 329 P.3d 833 
(relying on multiple-prosecution cases to determine whether a 
separate crime arose out of the same criminal episode as an 
earlier prosecuted offense so as to bar a subsequent prosecution); 
State v. Strader, 902 P.2d 638, 642 n.7 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
( observing that the defendant's reliance on severance cases was 
unpersuasive where the question presented for appeal involved 
whether multiple prosecutions were appropriate); id. at 642 n.5 
(noting that "cases considering whether offenses are separate for 
double jeopardy purposes are not applicable in single criminal 
episode cases contesting the court's decision to join offenses" 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Lopez, 
789 P.2d 39, 44 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (stating that "the line of 
cases relied upon by defendant to establish that the present 
circumstances were not part of a single criminal episode are not 
applicable because they do not deal with the issues of joinder 
and severance of charges, but with determining if criminal acts 
are separate for double jeopardy purposes"). 
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an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (LexisNexis 2012). "Whether or not 
there is a single criminal objective 'depends on the specific facts 
of the case viewed under .. . the totality of the circumstances."' 
State v. Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, <JI 26, 294 P.3d 617 (omission in 
original) (quoting Strader, 902 P.2d at 642). In assessing the 
circumstances, a court must "focus[] more on a defendant's 
actions," and not on external factors that may link the charges 
together, to determine 'Whether "objectively" the conduct is 
"incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single 
criminal objective." West Valley City v. Parkinson, 2014 UT App 
140, <JI 7, 329 P.3d 833 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
1[17 In applying the definition of single criminal episode, case 
law within the second category suggests that a recurring concern 
is whether the commission of one crime is aimed at furthering 
the accomplishment of the other crime. For example, in West 
Valley CihJ v. Parkinson, 2014 UT App 140, 329 P.3d 833, police 
responded to a call of domestic violence to find that the 
defendant was no longer at the home. Id. 11 2. While one officer 
was interviewing the victim, the officer saw the defendant drive 
by the house. Id. Based on his interview with the victim, the 
officer believed that the defendant had a child in the car, and he 
therefore attempted to stop the vehicle through hand gestures 
and verbal commands. Id. The defendant failed to stop, and 
the officer pursued by vehicle, eventually apprehending the 
defendant. Id. After being charged with four misdemeanor 
domestic violence charges in justice court, the defendant pleaded 
guilty to misdemeanor domestic violence assault. Id. <JI 3. About 
one week after the defendant's guilty plea, the City filed an 
information in district court charging the defendant with crimes 
related to the police chase. Id. 11 4. On the defendant's motion, 
the district court concluded that the new charges were part of 
the same criminal episode as the domestic violence charges and 
dismissed them. Id. The City appealed, and we reversed, 
concluding that "the domestic violence charges filed with the 
justice court and the conduct for which charges were filed in 
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the district court did not share a common criminal objective." Id . 
1I 7. We reasoned that, viewing the circumstances in an objective 
manner and with a narrow view of "single criminal episode," 
the defendant's actions in leaving the scene once the police had 
been called were "not incident to the accomplishment of his 
domestic violence objectives," which were to "harm[] or 
frighten[]" the victim, but rather were "motivated by [the 
defendant]'s objective of eluding police." Id. 1I 9. 
<[18 Likewise, in State v. Strader, 902 P.2d 638 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995), we concluded that the defendant's actions in stealing a 
circular saw, providing false identification, and possessing drugs 
did not have a single criminal objective. Id. at 639, 643. There, an 
officer pulled over the defendant's vehicle after the officer saw 
the defendant enter a construction site and return to his car 
carrying an object. Id. at 639. When asked for identification, the 
defendant gave his correct name but provided the officer with a 
clearly altered license that had a false name on it. Id. The officer 
arrested the defendant for false identification and, in a search 
incident to impounding the car, discovered methamphetamine 
as well as the object (a stolen circular saw) that the officer had 
seen the defendant carrying from the construction site. Id. The 
defendant pleaded guilty to the false identification charge. Id. at 
640. Later that month, the State filed charges for all three 
offenses: theft, false identification, and possession of a controlled 
substance. Id. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the 
conduct arose from a single criminal episode for which he had 
already been prosecuted. Id. The district court denied the 
defendant's motion, except as to the false identification charge to 
which the defendant had already pleaded guilty. Id. The 
defendant then entered a plea agreement under which he would 
plead guilty to the possession charge in exchange for the 
dismissal of the theft charge and the right to appeal the denial of 
the motion to dismiss. Id. 
<[19 On appeal, we affirmed the district court's denial of the 
motion to dismiss. Id. at 643-44. Again taking a narrow view of 
what constituted a single criminal episode, we reasoned that the 
"only possible nexus between the crimes was [the defendant's] 
20120969-CA 13 2015 UT App 170 
State v. Rushton 
intent to avoid arrest on the [theft and possession] charges by 
giving false identification." Id. Yet the defendant's provision of 
"a forged driver's license [that he had] at hand seem[ed] to 
indicate that obscuring his identity was an ongoing and routine 
course of conduct" and was "not specifically done to somehow 
further his theft or drug possession activities." Id.; see also Selzer, 
2013 UT App 3, 11113-5, 26 (concluding that a sexual assault 
followed by a physical assault on the same victim nearly three 
hours later did not share a cri..rninal objective because the acts 
were conducted for "very different purpose[s]" in that the 
physical assault, which was an act of "rage," did not further 
the defendant's purpose in committing the earlier sexual assault, 
which was done to fulfill the defendant's desire for II sexual 
gratification and domination of the victim in a sexual act" 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
1[20 Considering the totality of the circumstances of this case, 
we conclude that as in Parkinson and Strader, Rushton' s actions 
in the wage case and the tax case were not incident to the 
accomplishment of a single criminal objective. Rather, the crimes 
in each case are entirely separate. In the tax case, Rushton' s 
actions involved taking funds owed to the government by failing 
to pay taxes and falsifying withholding-tax statements and W-2s, 
while in the wage case, he took funds owed to employees when he 
failed to pay earned wages and to remit withheld retirement 
savings to the designated retirement funds. And although 
Rushton contends that the activities underlying each case had 
the common purpose of keeping Fooptube afloat, keeping a 
company financially stable is a lawful objective, not a criminal 
one. Rather, his criminal objective in each case ,vas to steal 
money to which he was not entitled. 
1[21 Moreover, Rushton' s actions in stealing from employees 
did not further his objective of stealing from the government, 
even if it did advance his ultimate goal of keeping Fooptube 
financially viable. And Rushton' s argument that the crimes were 
linked by his ultimate goal of mtlawfully appropriating the 
money of others views his II objective" from too elevated a 
vantage point. The narrow label of single criminal objective is 
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not meant to encompass such a broad criminal goal because if it 
did, then almost any series of crimes committed for the purpose 
of illegally obtaining money, say to feed a drug habit, could be 
described as "single."8 Rather, the fact that the thefts ultimately 
benefitted the same company is merely an external factor that 
provides some link between the offenses, but it does not 
appropriately "focus[] more on the defendant's actions" or his 
purpose in committing the acts. 9 See Parkinson, 2014 UT App 140, 
<JI 7. 
8. Indeed, from this viewpoint, a defendant's entering an 
apartment building first to steal dimes from its laundry room 
and then to steal money or other items of value from an 
apartment unit ought to meet the single criminal objective 
requirement. See State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1176-78 (Utah 
1985). Yet, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that these 
activities constituted two separate burglary offenses despite the 
defendant's apparent common objective of stealing as much as 
possible from a single building. Id. at 1178 (considering whether 
the defendant could be prosecuted for more than one crime for 
activities arising out a single criminal episode); cf State v. Bauer, 
792 N.W.2d 825, 830 (Minn. 2011) (explaining, in the context of 
determining that the State's decision to charge the defendant 
with both the sale of a controlled substance and failure to affix 
tax stamps to a controlled substance did not punish the same 
conduct twice, that "the criminal plan of obtaining as much 
money as possible is too broad an objective to constitute a single 
criminal goal" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
9. That conclusion is underscored by the fact that Rushton's 
actions in stealing from the government and stealing from the 
employees, though characterized by the district court as 
occurring "close in time" due to the overlap in their commission, 
also had some temporal distinctions. Rushton falsified tax 
documents and failed to pay taxes from 2006 until June 2008, 
which was about the time that the state tax commission began 
(continued ... ) 
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1[22 We are unpersuaded by Rushton's other arguments for 
treating the wage case and the tax case as having the same 
criminal objective. For instance, Rushton argues that less 
emphasis should be placed on the number of victims because 
even when there are multiple victims, the underlying actions can 
still arise from a single criminal episode. In support of his 
position, Rushton cites several cases where the defendant was 
tried on multiple charges resulting from his actions toward 
multiple victims. 
1[23 The cases Rushton relies on, which fall into category one, 
do not support his contention. In the cited cases, the defendants 
had already been prosecuted (in one trial) for multiple offenses 
and were appealing on the basis that the convictions constituted 
multiple punishments for the same conduct. Thus, the analysis 
on appeal focused on whether the defendant was properly 
convicted for multiple offenses, not on the issue presented 
here-whether the defendant's actions against multiple victims 
were aimed at the accomplishment of a single criminal objective 
so as to mandate their prosecution together. For example, in 
State v. James, 631 P.2d 854 (Utah 1981), the defendant was 
convicted on five counts of aggravated kidnapping for taking 
five people hostage during a drugstore robbery. Id. at 855. On 
appeal, the defendant argued that "his actions constituted a 
( ... continued) 
investigating him on suspicion of tax evasion. Although Rushton 
also stopped paying employees their wages and remitting their 
retirement withholdings som etime in 2008, that conduct 
continued through 2009, well after Rushton h ad ceased his tax-
related crimes. That Rushton stopped his tax scheme and turned 
to stealing money owed to his employees around that same time 
supports a determination that these two sets of criminal 
activities were not part of a single criminal objective but rather 
were two separate illegal means for achieving the ultimate goal 
of keeping the business afloat. 
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single criminal act, hence his constitutional right to not be twice 
placed in jeopardy for the same offense was violated." Id. The 
Utah Supreme Court concluded that double jeopardy did not 
preclude multiple convictions because "offenses committed 
against multiple victims are not the same." Id. at 856; see also 
State v. Rasabout, 2013 UT App 71, <_!I<_![ 10, 12, 33, 299 P.3d 625 
(stating, in the course of reversing the trial court's merger of 
twelve discharge of a firearm convictions, that whether the 
charges arose out of a single crimiI1al episode "does not resolve 
the question" because the issue presented in the case "was one of 
multiplicity and double jeopardy"), cert. granted, 308 P.3d 536 
(Utah 2013); State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(addressing "whether a single criminal act resulting in multiple 
victims constitutes a single offense or multiple offenses"). 
<J[24 In short, Rushton has not shown that the district court 
erred in deciding as it did. See State v. Selzer, 2013 UT App 3, 
<JI 27, 294 P.3d 617 (affirming the district court's denial of a 
motion to dismiss because although "other possible 
interpretations of [the defendant's] actions may be possible, the 
district court could certainly have accepted the State's argument 
and determined that the sexual assaults and [the physical] 
assault did not share a single criminal objective"); cf State v. 
Ireland, 570 P.2d 1206, 1207 (Utah 1977) (concluding that 
although the defendant made a plausible argument that "all [his] 
acts were directed toward escape," "the facts adequately 
support[ed] the trial court's determination that two separate and 
distinct offenses were committed"). 
<J[25 For these reasons, we affirm the district court's 
determination that Rushton's actions in the wage case were not 
incident to or in furtherance of his purpose in the tax case 
because the two sets of charges did not share a single criminal 
objective. Accordingly, the district court correctly denied 
Rushton' s motion to dismiss. 
20120969-CA 17 2015 UT App 170 
State v. Rushton 
CONCLUSION 
1[26 We conclude that there was a basis for the district court's 
decision that the actions underlying the wage case were not 
incident to the accomplishment of the criminal objective in the 
tax case. Consequently, the two sets of charges could properly be 
prosecuted in two separate actions and denial of the motion to 
dismiss was correct. We therefore affirm Rushton's convictions. 
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§ 77-Ba-1. Joinder of offenses and of defendants, UT ST§ 77-8a-1 
-- --- ---- ----- -- - - --· ------
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Chapter 8A. Criminal Offense Charges 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-8a-1 
§ 77-8a-1. Joinder of offenses and of defendants 
Currentness 
( l) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the same indictment or information if each offense is a 
separate count and if the offenses charged are: 
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in their commission; or 
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan. 
(2)(a) When a felony and misdemeanor are charged together the defendant is afforded a preliminary hearing with respect to 
both the misdemeanor and felony offenses. 
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if they are alleged to have participated 
in the same act or conduct or in the same criminal episode. 
(c) The defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged 
in each count. 
(d) When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, they shall be tried jointly unless the court in its 
discretion on motion or otherwise orders separate trials consistent with the interests of justice. 
(3)(a) The court may order two or more indictments or informations or both to be tried together if the offenses, and the 
defendants, if there is more than one, could have been joined in a single indictment or in formation. 
(b) The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under a single indictment or information. 
(4)(a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment 
or information or by a joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate trials of separate counts, grant a 
severance of defendants, or provide other relief as justice requires. 
(b) A defendant's right to severance of offenses or defendants is waived if the motion is not made at least five days before 
trial. In ruling on a motion by defendant for severance, the cow-t may order the prosecutor to disclose any statements made 
by the defendants which he intends to introduce in evidence at the trial. 
-----· --- ·--------------
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77-8a-1 permissive joinder 
Legislative History 
Floor Debate SB 181 Criminal Offense Charges 
This is really a housekeeping bill that came down from our County Attorney's Office there in Weber 
County, and it came out of the Senate on a consent calendar. Senate Bill 181 gives judges the opt ion to 
combine separate offenses in to one cha rge when they are part of a common scheme. That is if you 
impound control substances and also a car, instead of writing up a charge on theft of an automobile and 
the drugs they can be run together. The advantages are that its puts multiple crimes into perspective 
you might have some very weak counts, but when they are taken together, it's a sustainable crime. It is 
more efficient to handle t hese counts as a group, it saves time for the prosecutor, for t he defender, and 
it saves a great deal of paperwork. Now this requires a two-third vote and its changes a supreme court 
ruling. But many courts are now doing this in violation of this rule, and this bill is really to bring legality 
into what is going on in the name of efficiency. So I urge you to vote for this bill, and I have no 
compulsion to have a s~mmation. 
• 
§ 76-·1-401 . " Single criminal episode" defined-.. Joinder of offenses ... , UT ST§ 76-1-401 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 1. General Provisions (Refs & Annas) 
Pait 4. Multiple Prosecutions and Double Jeopardy 
U .C.A. 1953 § 76-1-401 
§ 76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined--Joinder of offenses and defendants 
Currentness 
In this part unless the context requires a different definition, "single criminal episode" means all conduct which is closely related 
in time and is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify the effect of Section 77-8a-l in controlling the joinder of offenses 
and defendants in criminal proceedings. 
Credits 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-1-401; Laws 1975, c. 47, § I; Laws 1995, c. 20, § 127, eff. May I , 1995. 
§ 76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal..., UT ST§ 76-1-402 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 1. General Provisions (Refs & Annas) 
Part 4. Multiple Prosecutions and Double Jeopardy 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-1-402 
§ 76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode--Included offenses 
Currentness 
(I) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; 
however, when the same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in 
different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal 
or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to 
promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single comt; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuti.ng attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned on the first information or 
indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may not be convicted of both the offense 
charged and the included offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or fo1m of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense 
otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis for a 
verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district comt on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate cowt on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that 
there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included 
. ---- ·-- --· --~ ---·--- - -- ------------
§ 76-1 -402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal. .. , UT ST§ 76-i-402 
offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for the included 
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
Credits 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-1-402; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 2. 
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§ 76-1 -403. Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution ... , UT ST§ 76-1-403 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 1. General Provisions (Refs & Annos) 
Pait 4. Multiple Prosecutions and Double Jeopardy 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-1-403 
§ 76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution for offense out of same episode 
Currentness 
(I) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution 
for the same or a different offense arising out of the same criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) the subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should have been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the 
former prosecution; and 
(b) the former prosecution: 
(i) resulted in acquittal; 
(ii) resulted in conviction; 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that 
necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be established to secure conviction in the subsequent 
prosecution. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty by the trier of facts or in a detennination that there 
was insufficient evidence to warrant conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of the greater 
offense even though the conviction for the lesser included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated. 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated; 
a verdict of guilty that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a judgment; or a plea of 
guilty accepted by the court. 
(4) There is an improper te1mination of prosecution if the tennination takes place before the verdict, is for reasons not amounting 
to an acquittal, and takes place after a jwy has been impaneled and sworn to tiy the defendant, or, if the jmy trial is waived, 
after the first witness is sworn. However, termination of prosecution is not improper if: 
- -··- --- .... - ----------- - ··- ----- -------------- ------~----------
§ 76-·l-403. Forme;· prosecut ion bari'in~J subsequent prosecution ... , UT ST§ 76-i-403 
----·---------·------ ~·-·· -----····---·---·-------- -------~ .. -~--- ·-·-·--·~---
(a) the defendant consents to the termination; 
(b) the defendant waives his right to object to the termination; or 
( c) the court finds and states for the record that the termination is necessary because: 
(i) it is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity with the law; 
(ii) there is a legal defect in the proceeding not atlTibutable to the state that would make any judgment entered upon a 
verdict re·versible as a 1nntter of la\.v; . 
(iii) prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtrnom not attributable to the state makes it impossible to proceed with the h·ial 
without injustice to the defendant or the state; 
(iv) the jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or 
(v) false statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial. 
Credits 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-1-403; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 3; Laws 2013, c. 278, § 55, eff. May 14, 20 13. 
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Part 4 
Multiple Prosecutions arrl Double Jeqxrn:iy 
Section 76-1-401. Forner provision: None 
Source : Cf. TIC Sec. 301 
Cam-ent: Tl¥; purpose of this section is to define o::m::luct which must be prose-
cuted in a single indictrrent or infomation. It is the pn:pose of 
tre sections relating to rrwtiple prosecutions under Part 4 to h:tve 
all offenses arising out of a "single criminal episode" brought ll1 
a single criminal action. A single cr:i.minal episode enc:aipasses that 
conduct which is closely related in time arrl is incident to an at~ 
or an aco:nplisrnent of a single criminal objective. For exalnl?le, 
actor wh:i enters a d~lling with intent to o:mnit larceny and m the 1 prcx:ess ccnm.its a se..'CUal assault upon a female, then forces the f~ e 
to leave with him as a hostage to insure his get-away would be guilty 
of burglary, sexual assault, and kidnapping. Because all of these . _ 
events ~e closely related in time arrl ~e incident to the aco:rrp~h 
rrent of a single criminal objective, i.e. the burglary an::1 escape , Y 
would necessarily constitute a singl e criminal episode. a:;,...,ever, the 
individual who might pass forged checks over a period of ~~al weeks, 
although he had a si.~le criminal cbjective, i.e. the obta~ing of 
rroney by forgery, tre single criminal episode would not ~st because 
the offenses w:>uld not be closely related in tirre. 'fuus, m the fo:rrrer 
case, all the offenses a::mnitted by the defendant \<.OUld have to be 
charged in a singl e criminal action. However, in the latter case, 
separate ch3.rges oould be brought. 
Section 76-1-402. Forrrer provision: Cf. Sec . 77-21-31, UCA (as arrended 1957); 
Sec. 76-1-23, UCA (1953) 
Source: MPC Sec. 107; TIC Sec 302 
Cattrent: Under subparagraph (1) of this section, a defendant may be prosecuted 
in one action for all separate offenses arising out of the sarre criminal 
episcxle . ~;ever, if tre corrluct of the defendant uoo.er a single crim-
inal episode shall establish offenses which might be punished in differ-
ent ways w1der different provisions of the Code , such conduct is to be 
punishable only under one such provision, and a conviction under any 
such provision is a bar to prosecution under any otber ccrnparable pro-
vision. Sec. 76-1-23, UCA (1953). This section is ccmparable to fomer 
Sec. 76-1-23, UCA (1953) . 
Subparagraph (2) of this section requires that all offenses aris-
ing out of a single criminal episode, unless the court should otherwise 
order, must be jointly brought in a criminal action. The essence of 
this provision is to preclu::le prosecution fran withoolding charges 
arising out of a single criminal epi sode against a defendant merely to 
be prosecuted at sorre later tirre . Tre right of a prosecutor to dismiss 
certain charges under a CXITplaint or information is not barred. How-
ever, the prosecutor rrust bring all charges arising fran the single 
criminal epi~e or ~ same will be barred. See Sec. 76-1-403 (1) (a). 
~ther reqw.rerrents with respect to charging for a single criminal 
e]ilisode are that tre offenses must be within the jurisdiction of a 
si.ng~e court an:l ~ :=o the p~osecution at· the tine the deferrlant is 
arraigned on the first information or indictrrent. 
. Under. sW?paragrap~ (~), a defendant may be oonvicted of an offense 
incl~ within the prin71P:-l offense charged; ~, he may not be 
convicted of both the principal offense and included offense, 
. . Under subparagraphs (a) , {b) , and (c) , a defense is included when 
it i~ established~ proof of the sarre or less than all of the facts 
rdt:'; to ets~tish thl~ ~ssion of the offense charged or it con-
s u an a ~·'t' , so ici tation oonspiracy O f • 
camri.t the offense or it i s specifically design.a' ~ omerby preparation to 
l esser incltrled offense. a statute as a 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v . 
MAUREEN D. RUSHTON 
DOB: 06/25/1964 
DAVID M. RUSHTON 
DOB: 09/18/1955 
Defendants. 
INFORMATION 
Criminalf{(;f l d')J 
u- t ,~07JOlP 1 
Criminal No. , 50 1.107Jatu 
The undersigned SCOTT MANN, states on information and belief that the defendants 
committed the crime(s) of: 
COUNT 1 
OFFENSES RELATING TO TAXATION: 
FAILING TO RENDER PROPER TAX RETURNS (Withholding Tax Returns), a Third 
Degree Felony, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or before the 31st.day of March 2007, 30th 
day of June 2007, 30th day of September 2007, the 3 p t of December 2007; the 3 p t day of March 
2008, and/or tI-ie 30th day of June 2008, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 8, Section l IOl(l)(c), 
Utah Code, in that the defendants, MAUREEN D. RUSHTON and DAVID M. RUSHTON , as 
parties to the offense, with an intent to evade any tax or requirement of Title 59 or any lawful 
requirement of the State Tax Commission, failed to make, render sign, or verify any return or to 
supply any information within the time required, or did make, render, sign, verify any false or 
fraudulent return or statement, or supplied false or fraudulent infonnation; to wit, the defendants 
failed to file with.holding tax returns and/or filed a false withholding returns for quaiierly 
repmiing requirements for the tax year(s) 2007 through 2008 inclusive . 
COUNT 2 
OFFENSES RELATED TO TAXATION: 
INTENT TO EV ADE (\-\'ithholding Taxes) 31 si day of March 2007, 301h day of June 2007, 301h 
day of September 2007, the 3 l51 of December 2007, the 3 l51 day of March 2008, and/or the 30th 
day of June 2008, in violation of Tit le 76, Chapter 8, Section l lOl(l)(d), Utah Code, the 
defendants MAUREEN D. RUSHTON and DAVID M . RUSHTON, as parties to the offense, 
intentionally or willfully attempted to evade or defeat a tax or the payment thereof; to wit, the 
defendants did take distinct actions and undertook specific acts to evade their withholding tax 
obligations in that they did co-mingle funds and/or created false documentation, as well as other 
steps to evade the payment of their withholding tax obligations for tax years from 2007 through 
2008. 
COUNT3 
UNLAWFUL DEALING OF PROPERTY BY A FIDUCIARY (Employees W2 
Withholding), a Second Degree Felony, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah on or before the 31 st 
day of March 2007, 30111 day of June 2007, 30th day of September 2007, the 31st of December 
2008, the 31 s i day of March 2008, and/or the 30th day of June 2008, in violation of Utah Code 
Title 76 Chapter 6 Section 513, inclusive, in Salt Lalce County, State of Utah, the defendants 
MAUREEN D. RUSHTON and DAVID M. RUSHTON, as parties to the offense, did deal with 
property that has been entrusted to them as fiduciaries, iJ.1 a manner which they knew was a 
violation of their duty and which involved substantial risk of loss or detriment to the ovvner(s) or 
to a person(s) for whose benefit the property was entrusted, and the value of the property was or 
exceeded $5,000.00; to wit, the defendants as a fiduciary for their company did obtain and deal 
with withholding of employee taxes in excess of $5,000.00 and did fail to remit the same to the 
State of Utah. 
COUNT4 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
on or about January 31, 2008 in violation of Utah Code Title 76 Chapter 10 Section 1801 and 
Title 76 Chapter 2 Section 202 defendants, MAUREEN D. RUSHTON and DAVID M . . 
RUSHTON, as paiiies to the offense, did devise a scheme or artifice to defraud another or to 
obtain money, property, or anything of value from another by false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions, and communicated directly or indirectly with 
any person by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or ai1ifice and 
the value of the property defrauded or obtained is or exceeds $5,000.00; to wit, the defendants 
devised a scheme or artifice to obtain or defraud money from the State ofUtal1 by issuing 
fraudulent \V-2 forms and withholding-tax statements to employees for use in filing individual 
income tax returns to the State of Utah. 
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COUNTS 
OFFENSES RELATING TO TAXATION: 
FAILING TO RENDER PROPER TAX RETURNS (Tax Returns - Personal), a Third 
Degree Felony, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or before the I 5th day of April for each of 
the following years, 2006, 2007 and/or 2008, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 
1 I0I(l)(c), Utah Code, in that the defendants, MAUREEN D. RUSHTON and DAVID M. 
• R_USI-ITON, as parties to the offense, with an intent to evade any tax or requirement of Title 59 
or any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission, failed to make, render sign, or verify 
any return or to supply any information within the time required, or did make, render, sign, 
verify any false or fraudulent return or statement, or supplied false or fraudulent information; to 
n,;+ i-1,0 rl0f'0nrl,,,,+" -r,,;1.,.,-1 +,.. F.1.,. ,,0,•sr.n,:,l ;,,,.,,..,,,.,. +<>v , • .,.-1,,,.,,s f',..,. tl,0 +<>v ""'""'·fs'I ')()(), 2nnh 
'r'l'.1.t..) t..J...1.V UV.1.V J.U.U..LJ.t..J .t..UJ..J.VU \,V J...LJ.V jJV.l. V.1.Ll,U,. J..,U.VVJ..J.J.V t..L.4-Jl.. ..LVt..l.U.1...L .1.V.1. \..J...LV t..U..:'.lt.. JVUJ..\ / k/VV..J) VV\...J 
and/or 2007. 
COUNT6 
ENGAGING IN A PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY, (RACKETEERING), a 
SECOND DEGREE FELONY, a Second Degree Felony, in Salt Lake Cow1ty, State of Utah on 
or about the 31st day of March 2007 through June 2008 in violation of Utah Code Title 76 
Chapter 10 Section 1603, concerning the establishment known as Fooptube LLC, located in or 
doing business in Salt Lake County, in that the defendants MAUREEN D. RUSHTON and 
DAVID M. RUSHTON as a parties to the offense: 
(1) received proceeds derived, either directly or indirectly, from a pattern ofun.lmvful 
activity in which the defendants participated as a principal, and then used or invested, directly or 
indirectly, any part of that income, or the proceeds of the income, or the proceeds derived from 
the investment or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment 
or operation of, any enterprise; or 
(3) was employed by or associated with the enterprise, and did conduct or participate, 
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of that enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unla,vf1.1l 
activit-y. · 
Notice of Predicate Offenses: 
For purposes of establishing defendant's pattern of unlawf1.ll activity, the State of Utah 
asserts tl1at defendants, MAUREEN D. RUSHTON and DAVID M. RUSHTON, has engaged in 
conduct, which constitutes the commission of at least three episodes of unlawful activity, which 
conduct is alleged as fo llows: 
FAILURE TO FILE OR RENDER A PROPER TAX RETURN, two (2) Third Degree 
Felony offenses, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, fo r the tax years/periods 2005, 2006, 
2007 and/or 2008, in violation of Utah Code §76-8-1 l0l(l)(c). 
3 
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INTENT TO EVADE, one (1) Second Degree offense, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, for the tax repo1ting quaiters of 2007, through the first two tax reporting quarters of 2008 
inclusive, in violation of Utah Code §76-8-1 l Ol (l )(d). 
UNLAWFUL DEALING BY A FIDUCIARY, one (1) Second Degree offense, in Salt 
Lake Count, State of Utah, for the tax reporting quarters of years 2007 through the first two 
quarters of2008 inclusive, in violation of Utah Code §76-6-5 13. 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, one (1) Second Degree Felony in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, occurring or about January 31, 2008, in violation of Utah Code §76-10-1 801 and 
76-2-202. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM AN 
INVESTIGATION WHICH INCLUDES Tiffi FOLLOWING WITNESSES OR 
EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES: 
1. Scott Ma1111, (USTC) Utah State Tax Commission Investigator. 
2. Dolores Furness, Keeper of the Records, USTC. 
3. Utah State Tax Commission, Auditing Department. 
4. Keeper of the Records, Utah Department of Commerce. 
5. Keeper of Records, Utah Department of Public Safety. 
6. Various employees/fo1111er employees of Fooptube LLC. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT 
Affiant, under oath, bases this Infonnation upon the fo llowing: 
1. I, Scott Mann, am an investigator with the Utah State Tax Commission's 
Criminal Investigation Unit. 
2. I have reviewed information in my file and investigated allegations of 
violations of the Utah Criminal Code as it relates to taxes and related criminal activity 
against the above cited defendants, MAUREEN D. RUSHTON and DAVID M. 
RUSHTON. 
3. The files and/or records of the following agencies have been reviewed as part 
of my investigation: 
The Utah State Tax Commission. 
The Utah Depaitment of Commerce. 
The Utah Department of Public Safety. 
The Utah Department of Workforce Services. 
The West Valley City Business License Depaitment. 
4 
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4. At all times relevant to this Information, the defendants appear to have lived 
and/or worked in the State of Utah and at times relevant to this matter the defendants, 
owned a business and/or managed or was employed and/or was receiving income in the 
State of Utah. 
5. Records of various governmental agencies identify defendants MAUREEN D. 
RUSHTON and DAVID M. RUSHTON as the owners and/or operators of a business 
offering programming and design services, the business being known as Fooptube LLC 
and/or was an officer or manager of said business at times relevant to these allegations. 
Records of various govermnent agencies indicate that the defendants began this business 
on or about January 2005. Interviews with employees, Fooptube LLC's corporate 
coui1sel and ~vvitl1 defendant David ~/I. P'--usl1ton confim1ed that the P .... usl1tons ra..11 the 
company. 
6. · MAUREEN D. RUSHTON AND DAVID M. RUSHTON are and/or have 
been husband and wife with a common residence during all times relevant to this rnatter. 
7. The defendants have been principals and/or held themselves out to be a 
principal of said business since its creation and in any event at all times relevant to this 
Information. The business has operated with as many as 211 employees. 
8. During the course of my investigation I interviewed current and former 
employees of Fooptube LLC and reviewed info1mation obtained that related to 
withholding taxes collected by Fooptube LLC from employees working at the company. 
9. That information was cross-referenced with information and records gathered 
from the various governmental agencies listed above. 
10. The results of this records check shows that the defendants, while 
acting as principals with authority over the business of Fooptube LLC, withheld payroll 
taxes from individual employees and held such funds as fiduciaries ano. failed to remit 
the same to the Utah State Tax Com.n1ission. 
11. In addition, the defendants failed to file withholding tax returns as required 
with the Utah taxing authorities. 
12. During the course of my investigation, defendants MAUREEN D. 
RUSHTON AND DAVID M. RUSHTON, were informed and/or became aware of their 
failures to file withholding tax returns on behalf of the aforementioned business. 
Subsequent to that time, the defendants, untimely, filed various withholding tax returns, 
however they have failed to remit withheld funds to date. 
13. Several attempts have been made by representative of the Utah State Tax 
Commission to contact the defendants in this case to have the defendants remit or work 
5 
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toward remitting the improperly held withholding taxes. To date, there has been a failure 
to respond and remit the same. 
14. For various years before the years included in this Information, the 
defendants were informed of their failure to file withholding tax returns and/or remit 
withholding taxes by and through various civil proceedings at or with the Utah State Tax 
Commission. These hearings reiterated and reinforced the defendants' lmowledge of 
their obligations and further illustrates that the defendants actions in this matter were 
knowingly and/or intentionally committed. 
15. In January 2008, Fooptube LLC was required by law to provide W-2 reports 
to employees. At that time, the defendants co1m1rnnicated, or caused to be 
communicated untruthful/bogus W-2 documents purpo1iecl to represent the withholding 
of Utah state withholding taxes for the time periods in question in the aggregate amount 
of in excess of $585,917.89 from, at or about, 211 employees ofFooptube LLC. 
16. None of the funds referenced in the aforementioned W-2 documents were 
ever remitted to the State of Utah. 
17. Neve1iheless, based upon the aforementioned bogus W-2 documents and by 
and through the filing of individual tax returns by the employees of Fooptube, credits 
were applied for the benefit of such employees and/or refunds were mailed out to such 
taxpayers. The amount of funds so ref·unded and/or credited totals in the amount at or 
about $585,917.89. 
18. The defendants have used and continued to use the improperly/fraudulently 
retained/converted funds to further their business enterprise as well as for their personal 
use. 
19. The defendants had control over the aforementioned business organization 
and the funds generated from such organization have been used, at least in part, to help 
continue such operation and/or continue the unlawful criminal activity. 
20. The total amount of taxes, interest and penalty that the defendants have failed 
to remit now total in or in excess of $1,213,528.02, this amount being calculated to 
February 17, 2009. 
21. In addition, the defendants failed to file any personal income tax ret11rns for 
years 2005, 2006 and/or 2007 despite having income in amounts in excess of the 
minimum filing requirement amount at which point individuals are required to file Utah 
state income tax returns; to wit, the withheld withholding taxes alone were in excess of 
said minimum requirements, and those improperly retained funds/income were only one 
component of income attributable to the defendants during that time period. 
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22. It appears to this affiant that the defendants have, at a minimum, committed 
offenses relating to taxation, have unlawfully dealt with monies as :fiduciaries, commit1ed 
communication fraud with respect to the improper/bogus \1/-2s and engaged in a pat1ern 
of unlawful activity. 
~?'?~ 
Scott Mann 
USTC Investigator, Affiant 
~~~~-~s,21,1 rn to before me this -D---1-..,,;,:. 
--~,.._;;::~e:'::i::-, 2009. 
Authorized for presentment and filing: nRK SI--TIJRTLEFF, At1orney General 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, ST A TE OF UT AH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DAVID M. RUSHTON 
DOB: 09/18/1955 
Defendants. 
AMENDED 
INFORMATION 
Criminal No. 111903029 
The undersigned SCOTT MANN, states on information and belief that the defendant 
committed the crime(s) of: 
COUNT 1 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, (Employment Agreement) a Second Degree Felony, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about calendar year 2008 in violation of Utah Code Title 76 
Chapter 10 Section 1801 and Title 76 Chapter 2 Section 202 defendant, DAVID M. RUSHTON, 
as a party to the offense, did devise a scheme or aiiifice to defraud another or to obtain money, 
property, or anything of value from another by false or fraudulent pretenses, representations , 
promises, or material omissions, and communicated directly or indirectly with any person by any 
means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice and the value of the 
prope1iy defrauded or obtained was or exceeded $5,000.00; to wit, the defendant devised a 
scheme or artifice to obtain or defraud money from the defendants' employee compensation 
and/or retirement anangements via false pretenses, representations, promises or omissions and 
did communicate such false promises or false or fraudulent pretenses with said employees. 
COUNT2 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD (Employment Agreement), a Second Degree Felony, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about calendar year 2009 in violation of Utah Code Title 76 
l 
Chapter 10 Section 1801 and Title 76 Chapter 2 Section 202 defendant, DAVID M. RUSHTON, 
as a party to the offense, did devise a scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain money, 
property, or anything of value from another by false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, 
promises, or material omissions, and communicated directly or indirectly with any person by any 
means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice and the value of the 
property defrauded or obtained was or exceeded $5,000.00; to wit, the defendant devised a 
scheme or artifice to obtain or defraud money from the defendants' employee compensation 
and/or retirement anangements via false pretenses, representations, promises or omissions and 
~ did communicate such false promises or false or fraudulent pretenses with said employees. 
~ \ COUNT 3 •? O j UNLAWFUL DEALING OF PROPERTY BY A FIDUCIARY (Employees Compensation), I., . ·,; 
.. a Second Degree Felony, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during calendar year 2008, in ,✓(':,{ lS", 
violation of Utah Code Title 76 Chapter 6 Section 513, the defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as . 
a party to the offense, did deal with property that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary, in a 
manner which he knew was a violation of his duty and which involved substantial risk of loss or 
detriment to the owner(s) or to a person(s) for whose benefit the property was entrusted, and the 
value of the property was or exceeded $5,000.00; to wit, the defendant as a fiduciaiy for his 
company did obtain and deal with employee wages and/or retirement funds in excess of 
$5,000.00 which had been entrusted to him and did fail to remit the same. 
COUNT4 
UNLAWFUL DEALING OF PROPERTY BY A FIDUCIARY (Employees Compensation), 
a Second Degree Felony, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during calendar year 2009, in 
violation of Utah Code Title 76 Chapter 6 Section 513, the defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as 
a party to the offense, did deal with prope1ty that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary, in a 
manner which he knew was a violation of his duty and which involved substantial risk of loss or 
detriment to the owner(s) or to a person(s) for whose benefit the property was entrusted, and the 
value of the prope1ty was or exceeded $5,000.00; to wit, the defendant as a fiduciary for his 
company did obtain and deal with employee wages and/or retirement frmds in excess of 
$5,000.00 which had been entrnsted to him and did fail to remit the same. 
COUNTS 
THEFT OF SERVICES (Employees Work), a Second Degree Felony, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, during calendar year 2008, in violation of Utah Code Title 76 Chapter 6 Section 
409, the defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the owner/manager/operator ofFooptube, LLC, 
did obtain services which he knew were available only for compensation by deception, threat, 
force, or any other means designed to avoid the due payment for them; to wit, the defendant 
obtained the use/benefit of the services up to 95 or more employees without the benefit of 
compensating said employees for their services, and the services were valued in excess of 
$5,000.00. 
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COUNT6 
THEFT OF SERVICES (Employees Work), a Second Degree Felony, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, during calendar year 2009, in violation of Utah Code Title 76 Chapter 6 Section 
409, the defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the owner/manager/operator of Fooptube, LLC, 
did obtain services which he knew were available only for compensation by deception, threat, 
force, or any other means designed to avoid the due payment for them; to wit, the defendant 
• obtained the use/benefit of the services up to 95 or more employees without the benefit of 
compensating said employees for their services, and the services were valued in excess of 
$5,000.00. 
In the Alternative to Counts 5 & 6 Onlv - Counts 7-19 Below: 
COUNT7 
FAILURE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NEW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES, 
a Class A Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during October 2008, in violation of 
Utah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the 
owner/manager/employer of Fooptube, LLC, did refuse to pay wages to his employees which 
were due and payable, or with an intent to secure for himself or any other person any discount 
upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of 
every wage claim due and unpaid. 
COUNTS 
FAILURE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NKW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES, 
a Class A Misdemeanor, in. Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during November 2008, in violation 
of Utah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the 
owner/manager/employer of Fooptube, LLC, did refuse to pay wages to his employees which 
were due and payable, or with an intent to secure for himself or any other person any discount 
upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of 
every wage claim due and unpaid. 
COUNT9 
FAILURE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NEW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES, 
a Class A Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during December 2008, in violation 
of Utah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the 
ovvner/manager/employer of Fooptube, LLC, did ref·use to pay wages to his employees which 
were due and payable, or with an intent to secure for himself or any other person any discount 
upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of 
every wage claim due and unpaid. 
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COUNT IO 
FAILURE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NEW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES, 
a Class A Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during January 2009, in violation of 
Utah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the 
owner/manager/employer of Fooptube, LLC, did refuse to pay wages to his employees which 
were due and payable, or with an intent to secure for himself or any other person any discount 
upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of 
every wage claim due and unpaid. 
COUNT 11 
FAILURE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NEW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES, 
a Class A Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during February 2009, in violation 
of Utah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the 
owner/manager/employer of Fooptube, LLC, did refuse to pay wages to his employees which 
were due and payable, or with an intent to secure for himself or any other person any discount 
upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of 
every wage claim due and w1paid. 
COUNT 12 
FAIL URE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NEW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES, 
a Class A Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during March 2009, in violation of 
Utah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the 
owner/manager/employer of Fooptube, LLC, did refuse to pay wages to his employees which 
were due and payable, or with an intent to secme for himself or any other person any discount 
upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of 
every wage claim due and unpaid. 
COUNT 13 
FAILURE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NEW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES, 
a Class A Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake County , State of Utah, during Apri l 2009, in violation of 
Utah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the 
owner/manager/employer of Fooptube, LLC, did refuse to pay wages to his employees which 
were due and payable, or with an intent to secure for himself or any other person any discount 
upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of 
every wage claim clue and unpaid. 
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COUNT14 
FAILURE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NEW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES, 
a Class A Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during May 2009, in violation of 
Utah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the 
owner/manager/employer of Fooptube, LLC, did refuse to pay wages to his employees which 
were due and payable, or with an intent to secure for himself or any other person any discount 
• upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of 
every wage claim due and unpaid. 
COUNT 15 
FAIL URE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NEW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES, 
a Class A Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during June 2009, in violation of 
Utah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the 
owner/manager/employer of Fooptube, LLC, did refuse to pay wages to his employees which 
were due and payable, or with an intent to secure for himself or any other person any discount 
upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of 
every wage claim due and unpaid. 
COUNT 16 
FAILURE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NEW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES, 
a Class A Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during July 2009, in vio lation of 
Utah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the 
owner/manager/employer of Fooptube, LLC, did refuse to pay wages to his employees which 
were due and payable, or with an intent to secure for himself or any other person any discount 
upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of 
every wage claim due and unpaid. 
COUNT17 
FAIL URE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NEW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES, 
a Class A Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during August 2009, in violation of 
Utah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DA YID M. RUSHTON, as the 
owner/manager/employer of Fooptube, LLC, did refuse to pay wages to his employees whic h 
were clue and payable, or with an intent to secure for himself or any other person any discount 
upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of 
every wage claim clue and unpaid. 
COUNT 18 
FAILURE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NEW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES, 
a Class A Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during September 2009, in violation 
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of Utah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the 
owner/manager/employer of Fooptube, LLC, did refuse to pay wages to his employees which 
were due and payable, or with an intent to secure for himself or any other person any discount 
upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of 
every wage claim due and unpaid. 
COUNT 19 
FAILURE TO PAY WAGES OR ADVISING NEW EMPLOYEES OF UNPAID WAGES, 
a Class A Misdemeanor, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during October 2009, in violation 
of Utah Code Title 34 Chapter 28 Section 12, defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON, as the 
owner/manager/employer of Fooptube, LLC, did refuse to pay wages to hi s employees which 
were due and payable, or with an intent to secure for himself or any other person any discount 
upon such indebtedness, or who hired additional employees without advising each of them of 
every wage claim due and unpaid. · 
COUNT20 
ENGAGING IN A PATTE~ OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY, a SECOND DEGREE 
FELONY, a Second Degree Felony, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah on or about years 2008 
and 2009, in violation of Utah Code Tit le 76 Chapter 10 Section 1603, concerning the 
establishment known as Fooptube LLC, located in or doing business in Salt Lake County, in that 
the defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON as a party to the offense: 
(1) received proceeds derived, either directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful 
activity in which the defendant paiiicipated as a principal, and then used or invested, directly or 
indirectly, any part of that income, or the proceeds of the income, or the proceeds derived from 
the investment or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment 
or operation of, any enterprise; or 
(3) was employed by or associated with the enterprise, and did conduct or pmt icipate, 
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of that enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful 
activity. 
Notice of Predicate Offenses: 
For purposes of establishing defendant's pattern of unlawful activity, the State of Utah 
asserts that defendant, DAVID M. RUSHTON, has engaged in conduct, which constitutes the 
commission of at least three episodes of unlawful activity, which conduct is alleged as follows: 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, two (2) Second Degree Felony offenses, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, for years 2008 and 2009, in violation of Utah Code §76-10-1801. 
UNLAWFUL DEALING BY A FIDUCIARY, two (2) Second Degree offenses, in Salt 
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Lake Count, State of Utah, for the calendar years 2008 and 2009 inclusive, in violation of Utah 
Code §76-6-513. 
THEFT OF SERVICES, two (2) Second Degree Felony offenses, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, for years 2008 and 2009 inclusive, in violation of Utah Code §76-6-409. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM AN 
e INVESTIGATION WHICH INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES OR 
EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO THE FOLLOWING WITNESSES: 
1. Scott Mann, Utah State Tax Commission (USTC) Special Agent. 
2. Negyssue A. Abraha, Agent, U.S. Dept of Labor Employee Benefits Security 
Administration. 
3. Ronald Ludlow, Utah Labor Commission. 
4. Keeper of the Records, Utah Labor Commission. 
5. Keeper of the Records, Utah Department of Commerce. 
6. Keeper of Records, Utah Department of Public Safety. 
7. Keeper of the Records, Utah Depaitment of Workforce Services. 
8. Various employees/former employees ofFooptube LLC. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT 
Affiant, under oath, bases this Information upon the following: 
1. I, Scott Mann, am a Special Agent with the Utah State Tax Commission's Criminal 
Investigation Unit. I am a ce1tified law enforcement officer for the State of Utah with over 33 
years of experience, which includes more than 21 years of conducting in-depth white collar fraud 
investigations and I cunently hold a designation as a Certified Fraud Examiner. 
2. I have conducted an investigation into the activities of David M. Rushton who owned 
and operated a business li sted as Fooptube LLC. As part of my investigation, I have personally 
reviewed documents from the Utah Department of Commerce, the U .S. Department of Labor, the 
Utah Labor Conm1ission, the Utah Department of Public Safety and the Utah Depaitment of 
Workforce Services. As well, I interviewed multiple individuals who were denied their wages by 
the defendant individually and/or by and tlu·ough the business Fooptube, LLC. 
3. The files and/ or records of the following agencies have been reviewed as part of my 
investigation: 
The Utah State Tax Commission. 
The Utah Department of Commerce. 
The Utah Department of Public Safety. 
The Utah Department of Workforce Services. 
The West Valley City Business License Depmtment. 
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The Utah Labor Commission. 
The U.S. Department of Labor. 
4. At all times relevant to this Info1mation, the defendant appears to have lived and/or 
worked in the State of Utah and at times relevant to this matter the defendant, owned and 
managed the business Fooptube L.LC. in the State of Utah. 
5. Records of various governmental agencies identify defendant DAVID M. RUSHTON 
as the principal/co-principal and/or operator of the business Fooptube LLC offering computer 
programming and design services. 
6. The defendant began this business on or about January 2005. 
7. Interviews with employees and with others confirmed that the defendant managed the 
company and was the individual who make decisions relevant to wages, compensation and the 
payment of same. 
8. During the years 2008 and 2009, the defendant promised wages and compensation to 
at least 95 individuals. Those individuals were never or completely compensated consistent with 
the information communicated by the defendant. 
9. During the years 2008 and 2009, the defendant kept and/or failed to remit wages to the 
aforementioned approximately 95 individuals. 
10. Acting as a fiduciary for said wages/funds, the defendant kept said wages/funds 
and/or failed to remit the same to said employees. 
11. The defendant accepted the services of said employees during years 2008 and 2009 
while lmowingly failing to recompense said individuals 
12. The results of my investigation show that at or about 95 of the defendant's employee, 
or at or about 50% of the defendant's workforce were not paid as required/promised. 
13. Moreover, during the same time period, the defendant did compensate/pay the wages 
of selected individuals, such as himself, his spouse, family members and other selected 
individuals. 
14. Utah Labor Commission records, which I personally reviewed, reflect that Fooptube 
employees have made wage claims against the company in an amount exceeding $1,170, 164.00. 
15. I have also reviewed records wherein the defendant David M. Rushton admits that he 
failed to pay employee wages. 
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16. Furthermore, the same records reflect that the defendant failed to remit fonds 
collected from employees for the purpose of depositing them into retirement funds (a 401 K 
and/or Roth 401 K pension fund accounts) that were set up or represented to have been set up at 
the Fooptube business for the benefit of the employees. 
17. The defendant has admitted to having not remitted funds so withheld on account of 
the aforementioned retirement funds and has also admitted that he knew he should have remitted 
• those funds. 
• 
18. In addition to any other unpaid wages, the defendant improperly with.held and failed 
to account for funds with.held from employees in/about the amount of $1,214,164.00 (as of 
February 2011) . 
19. The defendant undertook. the aforementioned activities as a regular part/pattern of his 
business operation and did improperly keep and/or use such funds as part of the funds within and 
sustaining his business, Fooptube, LLC. 
20. Several attempts had been made by employees and others to ameliorate the situation. 
To date, there has been a complete failure by the defendant to respond and/or remedy the 
situation concerning unpaid wages and/or the non-funding of the retirement accounts or take any 
meaningful steps in that direction. 
21 . The defendant have used and continued to use the improperly/fraudulently 
retained/conve1ied f-t.mcls, both f1.mcls that were clue and owing as wages and/or funds that were 
part of the employees retirement f-t.mds, to fu1iher his business enterprise and/or for personal use. 
22. The defendant asse11ed control over the aforementioned business organization and 
the funds generated from such organization have been used, at least in pai1, to help continue such 
operation and/or continue the unlawfu~a~activity . 
.. ~ ~q--, -
Scott Maim 
USTC Investigator, Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
r,tu hoLzed for presentment and filing: 
. I 1/ j 
, ,, RIZ SHUB.~~EFFJAlro111ey General 
. ! i /d,,L___; \ 
'-...._.....," s-/1 ~'-<-~.. ~ ~- II 2, \~ 
f k.\Baer, Ass11tITT'ff1\.ttorney General 
F:\User~~-AER\RushtonEmploymentCase\RushtonDavidlnfonnationEmployeeWageCase2ndAmended(Alternative 
Counts).~d 
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